cS> ^ 



vv-r^r : : 



**^ 






^r£ 











«S? ^ 



* «P ^ 






^ ^^ 






' * * s s \y c 6, 



w 















*<7vo\^ 

^ 



"^cF 










w 



-> G <^ ^ G 




1 ^ 







c <t. 



^6* 




"^rfr 



^ 



^0 V 




IP *" & °<* 






^ ^ 



F 








...^ 



> * v * ° a ^% \> * * * ° /• , ^ 



*k> *'.** s ^ v 







. <5i 










V 





<* ■< » * •> 














PRACTICAL LOGIC: 



OR 



HINTS 



YOUNG THEME-WRITERS, 

FOR THE 

PURPOSE OF LEADING THEM TO THINK AND REASON 
WITH ACCURACY. 



r 



By B. H. SMART, 



AUTHOR OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ELOCUTION, 

GRAMMAR OF PRONUNCIATION, GUIDE TO PARSING, 

&C. &C. 



' To teach the young idea how to shoot."— Thomson, 



LONDON : 
G. AND W. B. WHITTAKER, 

AVE -MARIA-LANE. 

1823. 



■$&<£ 



% 



/ 3i 



/6$ 

PREFACE. 



The little work here presented to the public, is an 
attempt to fill up a remarkable gap in the course 
of elementary treatises intended for youth. Among 
the interminable number of school books, there fe 
no one of a practical kind, expressly calculated 
for advancing pupils in the most important of ail 
attainments, — the art of just and accurate reason- 
ing. The ordinary systems of logic do not answer 
the end, and are accordingly always left for the 
study of riper years. What is wanting, and what 
this manual attempts to supply, is a plan which 
may lead young persons to think and reason for 
themselves, may point out the common errors to 
which they are liable, unfold as far as necessary, 
that is, as far as their practical improvement re- 
quires, the nature of an argument, and explain 
the terms of art which they will have to use or 
understand. The plan laid down is the result of 
actual experience in teaching. The author, though 

a3 



VI PREFACE* 

chiefly occupied as a lecturer on Elocution, is 
frequently required, particularly in ladies' schools, 
in some of the first of which, in and near London, 
he is the English master, to add to the Reading 
lesson some instruction in Composition ; and being 
conscious that accuracy of thought and reasoning 
ought to form the primary object of the exercises 
in this department, he has always been accus- 
tomed to call the attention of his pupils more 
closely, at first, to this point than to the niceties 
of style, lest the more important object should 
be overlooked and forgotten. But while the study 
table was loaded with books for their guidance in 
all that relates to grammar and diction, not one 
was at hand to clear the way immediately before 
them ; and their progress was therefore less cer- 
tain and satisfactory than it would otherwise have 
seemed, because the faults were undefined, by 
avoiding which their improvement was estimated. 

Such was the exigency that produced the fol- 
lowing pages. The detail of the plan will be best 
understood by running the eye over the table of 
contents. If some parts of the second and third 
chapters, which attempt to develop the nature of 
an argument on philosophical, though it is hoped, 



PREFACE. VII 

plain principles, should be deemed too much for 
the comprehension of beginners in theme-writing, 
let it be remembered that these parts are not 
meant to be forced on the pupil's attention, till he 
feels a want of the information contained in them. 
On first using the book, the teacher and pupil had 
better seek for assistance in Chapter the fourth, 
where the method of writing Themes is explained, 
and plans for several Themes are laid down. The 
pupil should then proceed at once to try his own 
powers on easy subjects, and read Chapter the 
first to assist his practice, the teacher taking care, 
in correcting his exercises, to point out how far 
he has fallen into, or avoided the faults which 
are there described and exemplified. At length, 
through these means, he will obtain some insight 
into the nature of an argument, and he will then 
be competent to pursue the inquiries in the sub- 
sequent chapters, the teacher, at the same time, 
being careful to try the reality of his progress by 
the questions in the Appendix. 

Though the book is intended chiefly for youth 
at school, the author presumes to think it may not 
be useless to many who have finished their early 
studies. They will smile, no doubt, at the rawness 



Vlll PREFACE. 

manifest in most of the examples, but the faults 
described are not less important to be guarded 
against, because the author has judged it best to 
illustrate them by instances taken from the themes 
of the younger among his pupils. Had he wished 
to give consequence to his little volume, he could 
easily have brought all his examples from works 
that have appeared in print. He is glad to avoid 
so invidious a course, particularly as perhaps 
some of his own pages might lay him open to re- 
crimination. 

50, Leicester Square, 
Feb, 20, 1823. 



CONTENTS AND ANALYSIS, 



CHAPTER I. 

THE 'COMMON FAULTS WHICH LEARNERS COMMIT IN 
WRITING THEMES DESCRIBED AND EXEMPLIFIED, VIZ. 

PAGE 
First General Fault, Verbiage ............................. 2 

Second General Fault, Confusion among the Thoughts •«....«. 3 

Third General Fault, Want of Connexion among the Thoughts. . 8 

Faults of Verbiage, 

Fourth Fault, Begging the Question 12 

Fifth Fault, Explaining a thing by itself .................... 13 

Sixth Fault, Distinction without a Difference ......*.. 14 

Faults from Confusion among the Thoughts. 

Seventh Fault, Confounding different Senses of the same Ex- 
pression ...» • •.. 15 

Eighth Fault, Overloading a Sentence <, • • 16 

Faults from want of Connexion among the Thoughts. 

Ninth Fault, Proposing too much 19 

Tenth Fault, Forgetting the Proposition .................... 20 



x CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Eleventh Fault, Discoursing short of the Proposition ........ 21 

Twelfth Fault, Discoursing wide of the Proposition 24 

Thirteenth Fault, Proving too little 26 

Fourteenth Fault, Proving too much 28 

CHAPTER II. 

On Generalizing •• 29 



CHAPTER in. 

ARGUMENTS AND THEIR SEVERAL KINDS EXPLAINED. 

The Nature of an Argument 38 — 52 

Names of Arguments derived from the Topics whence 
they are taken, viz, 

/Definition • 52 

Etymology 53 

Enumeration ••••.••••............• 54 

Species 55 

Genus ......••.••..••...........•........•••*•• 56 

Adjuncts •• 57 

Antecedents • • »•... 58 

Consequents idem 



Internal, j 



r, c emcient ) . . 

Cause, } i or a priori 

( final 5 



59 



Effect, or a posteriori • ••«.••••. idem 

Similitude • idem 

s a fortiori -^ 
Comparison, < analogical > 60 

v proportionate J 
Contraries 61 



CONTENTS. xi 

PAGE 

c Testimonies 62 

External. ^ Singular Examples idem 



Names of Arguments derived from the Data on which 
they rest, viz. 

Argumentum ad judicium 63 

Argumentum ad hominem idem 

Argumentum ad verecundiam, &c. 64 

Names of Arguments derived from the Forms in which 
they are expressed, viz. 

Syllogism 65 

Enthymeme idem 

Epichirema idem 

Dilemma 66 

Sorites, &c idem 

The Difference between Hypothetical and Categorical, direct 

and indirect Argument 67 

Reductio ad absurdum idem 



CHAPTER IV. 

ON THE METHOD OF WRITING THEMES, WITH EXAMPLES, 
AND PLANS FOR SEVERAL THEMES. 

On the Method of writing Themes 69—82 

Plans for Themes 82—91 

Subjects for Themes 91, 92 

Plans for Theses 92—98 



xii CONTENTS. 

APPENDIX. 

PAGE 

1. Questions for examining the Pupil, adapted to the foregoing 

Chapters • • 99 

2. A few general Rules for Punctuation . , ..,»«*.•».«. 107 



PRACTICAL LOGIC; 

OR, 

HINTS 

TO 

YOUNG THEME-WRITERS. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE COMMON FAULTS WHICH LEARNERS COMMIT IN 
WRITING THEMES, DESCRIBED AND EXEMPLIFIED. 

The word Theme properly means the subject of 
a discourse ; but the discourse itself, if merely an 
exercise in Composition, is also called a Theme. 

A Theme may otherwise be described, as in- 
deed it ought to be considered, an exercise in the 
art of thinking. In the earlier stages of educa- 
tion, the sole employment of learners is to collect, 
from others, materials for thinking: in writing 
themes, they are required to bring these materials 
into use by thinking for themselves. As to lan- 
guage, it should be considered only as the means 

B 



2 Verbiage. 

or instrument of thinking * and of making the 
thoughts known outwardly. Unless viewed in this 
light, and employed solely for these purposes, the 
pupil sets out on a wrong principle, and no real 
improvement will be made. Hence the first fault 
to be laid down as necessary to be avoided, is the 
undermentioned : 

FIRST FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 
Joining words and phrases together which seem, from 
their plausible sound and connexion, to convey a mean- 
ing, when, in reality, we have no clear thoughts on the 
subject to express. This forms what the French call, 
Verbiage, 

A pupil who has read a great deal, but has not 
thought a great deal, will have his head very full 
of book phraseology, and very empty of ideas, 
and will be apt to put this cheat upon himself, and 
possibly upon some others, by a kind of jargon, 
of which the following may serve as a specimen. 

ON EDUCATION. 

The invaluable blessings of a refined Education, are 
so multifarious in their extent, and so incalculable in 
their number, that the understanding and the imagina- 
tion are equally unable to comprehend the phenomena 

* To assert that language is the instrument of thinking 
must not startle the young reader : without representative 
signs of some kind, we could never abstract or generalize. 
This doctrine will become clearer, as he advances. 



Confusion among the Thoughts. S 

involved in the boundless subject. Who indeed can 
justly appreciate the ineffable advantages which accrue 
to gifted individuals, ardent to develop the germs of 
scientific lore ? Still less can we discern the endless 
ramifications springing from that centre, of which Edu- 
cation is the heart and soul. Educational discipline 
exalts the faculties, animates the mind, improves the 
understanding, and, by throwing a divine light on the 
abstract operations of human intellect, gives a new 
grace* to the whole character. Through the instru- 
mentality of the influence which Education alone can 
impart, we are lifted to another sphere. In short, Edu- 
cation is the first of things, the master key, the univer- 
sal good, and we are bound at once to reverence its 
authority, and apply to its pure fountain for mental 
delight, and intellectual improvement. 

SECOND FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 
Confusion among the thoughts ; arising from the ab- 
sence of all distinction and division. 

However confused, incorrectly expressed, and 
inelegant, a pupil's Exercise may be, yet if it ex- 
hibit the least evidence of some definite notions on 
the subject suggested, the work of correction may 
commence, and gradual improvement may thence- 
forward be expected :— it will be the teacher's bu- 
siness to show, in every exercise, how the thoughts 
may be better arranged, and more correctly ex- 
pressed ; and the pupil, by constant attention to 
these corrections, will grow into method and per- 
spicuity. But with an Exercise like the example 
b2 



4 Confusion among the Thoughts. 

just given, nothing can be done : it is not a begin- 
ner's Exercise in the art of thinking, but in a very 
different art ; and the teacher, to do his pupil jus- 
tice, must run the correcting pen through the 
whole, and require him to make altogether a new 
beginning. 

Possibly the learner, before every Exercise, will 
require to be assisted to a few thoughts ; nor must 
it be imagined, even if he is indebted to his teacher 
for every sentiment he expresses, that they are the 
less his own: for are not all his sentiments ac- 
quired ? — how, and at what time, is of little mo- 
ment, if it be certain that his mind completely 
entertains and acknowledges them. But between 
two pupils thus assisted by their teacher, one of 
whom makes his Theme an Exercise of thought, 
and the other, an Exercise of words, there will be 
this difference, — the former will forget many of 
the expressions, but will carry away the meaning, 
which he will embody in more homely, and less 
correct language of his own ; the latter will carry 
away all the best sounding words and phrases, with 
which he will make an incoherent jumble, wearing 
much of the outward form of what the teacher 
suggested, without any of the spirit. An Exer- 
cise of this kind affords no promise ; — it is alto- 
gether an erroneous attempt; and the teacher 
can do nothing but send his pupil back, perhaps 
with new assistance, to make another trial : but 
an Exercise of the other kind, however meagre 



Confusion among the Thoughts. 5 

and deficient, may be accepted for a beginning : 
improvement will come with practice. The fol- 
lowing is an example of a very humble attempt, 
but still of one that affords some promise. 

ON EDUCATION. 

Education is certainly one of the most important 
things which belong to man, and the most useful and 
essential of any, if we reflect what a wild savage race 
we should be, if it were not for this inestimable blessing, 
and how very fortunate they ought to think themselves 
who have parents both able and willing to be at the ex- 
pense of it, without which we should not know the 
Author of our existence to whom we are indebted for 
all our blessings and comforts, and we should not be 
able to provide for ourselves, for it is not the same with 
us as it is with birds, which instinct teaches to provide 
for themselves when they leave the nest of their parents, 
instead of which we are not only made agreeable in so- 
ciety, but if we make a proper use of it, it is the source 
of all happiness, and therefore since we are sensible of 
its worth, let us who possess it think ourselves unspeak- 
ably happy, and never think it too much trouble to 
obtain, for surely it is the least we can do for such a 
valuable benefit. 

This production is an attempt to form a con- 
nected discourse out of a number of remarks, 
which, for the purpose, are indiscriminately hud- 
dled together by an undue use of conjunctions, 
relatives, and other uniting particles. And 
this may serve as a specimen of what will gene- 

b3 



6 Confusion among the Thoughts. 

rally be the first essay of every young student. 
As yet, it is evident he knows nothing of the art 
of Composition ; for Composition means arrange- 
ment, and of this his remarks are altogether des- 
titute. It is in seeing his Theme corrected that 
he gets the first insight into his business; and 
therefore the nature of the corrections must be 
carefully studied. Let him observe, then, that 
all the remarks he has made do not come under 
the same description ; for some might come under 
this head — On the importance of Education ; and 
some under this — On our duty as young students ; 
and thus the Theme separates into two smaller 
Themes, to be signified by a division or break 
forming what are called Paragraphs # . And 
again, let him consider, that if the remarks in 
each of these paragraphs explain, illustrate, and 
enforce each other, there is no necessity for any 
closer connection ; and instead of huddling them 
together, he ought to keep them separate and 
distinct, in order that every remark may be clearly 
apprehended in its turn. For this purpose, let 
him use the period or full stop as often as any as- 
sertion, or any single argument, or any remark of 
whatever kind, seems of consequence enough to 
stand by itself; and where the connexion seems 
too close for a period, let him use a colon or semi- 

* Chapter III. on the Method of writing Themes, must be 
referred to for further information on this point. 



Confusion among the Thoughts. 7 

colon, and the comma only where the construction 
of the sentence evidently forbids any higher stop # . 
Thus by division and subdivision, with a few 
minor corrections, this first Exercise will be 
moulded into the following shape. 

ON EDUCATION. 

Education is the most important and essential con- 
cern of man. For let us reflect what a wild, savage 
creature he would be, without this inestimable blessing. 
He would not know the Author of his existence, to 
whom he is indebted for all his comforts. He would 
not be able to provide for himself. For it is not the 
same with man as it is with birds : they know, almost 
entirely by instinct, how to provide for themselves ; 
but all knowledge necessary to man, comes by Educa- 
tion. It is Education which lifts him from his helpless 
state, makes him an agreeable member of society, and 
prepares him for all happiness. 

Since, then, education is so important, let us to whom 
it is offered think ourselves unspeakably happy, and 
never imagine we can employ too much pains to secure 
all its advantages. Let us reflect how very fortunate 
we are in having parents both able and willing to be at 
the expense of books and instructors ; and let us show 
our gratitude by our willingness to learn, which is 
surely the least return we can make for benefits so 
valuable. 

* For further directions respecting punctuation, consult 
the general rules in the Appendix. 

B 4 



3 Want of Connexion among the Thoughts. 

THIRD FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 

Want of Connexion among the Thoughts* 
From one extreme, it is not unlikely that the 
learner may run into another. Warned by the 
confusion which appeared in his first attempt, and 
aiming at the greater distinctness of the corrected 
copy, he will perhaps, at the next attempt, pro- 
duce an Exercise formed of sentences after the 
following manner : 

ON FRIENDSHIP. 

Friendship is a subject which has often employed the 
pen of the moralist. We all feel that Friendship is ne- 
cessary to our happiness. Many persons pretend to be 
influenced by Friendship, who are incapable of so noble 
a sentiment. Without a friend, the world &c. &c. 

Sentences of this kind do not form a theme, be- 
cause, though they all relate to the same subject, 
they are not parts of the same train of thoughts : 
they are entirely independent of each other, and 
ought indeed not to be written down in immediate 
succession, but with breaks in the manner of para- 
graphs, thus : 

Friendship is a subject which has often employed the 
pen of the moralist. 

We all feel that Friendship is necessary to our hap- 
piness. 

Many persons pretend to be influenced by Friend- 
ship, who are incapable of so noble a sentiment. 



Want of Connexion among the Thoughts. 9 

This is the way to write maxims or proverbs, 
but a theme must be managed very differently. 
We must not start from one remark to another 
which has no immediate relation to it, but consider 
how the proposition we set out with, can be en- 
forced or supported by remarks tending to the 
same purpose, till nothing more seems needful to 
be said upon that branch of the subject # . And 
where a remark appears to be destitute of a suffi- 
cient purpose, we must either reject it altogether, 
or turn it to a purpose by the remarks that follow 
it : — the first of the foregoing remarks is an in- 
stance, — "Friendship is a subject that has often 
employed the pen of the moralist." It seems hardly 
worth while to make this remark for the sake of 
itself, and therefore we expect some following re- 
marks to define its purpose : for example : 

Friendship is a subject which has so often employed the 
pen of the moralist^ that the few thoughts it may sug- 
gest to my mind, cannot be either novel or striking. 
Yet my remarks, though trite, may deserve some atten- 
tion, because the subject itself is of the highest im- 
portance. 

Thus amplified, the sentence forms a proper 
introductory paragraph. The next sentence may 
now be taken, and followed up thus : 

We all feel that Friendship is necessary to our happi- 

* The invention of arguments is treated of in the latter 
part of Chapter III. 

B 5 



10 Want of Connexion among the Thoughts. 

ness. Framed for society, we stand in continual need 
of assistance, support, advice, and sympathy. But the 
coldness of the world, and even the indifference of our 
own hearts to all except a few by whom we are sur- 
rounded, soon teach us, that, without sincere friends, 
we may look for these good offices in vain. Therefore 
we always flatter ourselves we possess friends, though 
there are many who pass through life unendeared to a 
single heart, and who are never served or assisted but 
through motives of interest or of fear. 

This paragraph being completed, we may take 
the next sentence as the ground of another : 

Many persons pretend to be influenced by Friendship, 
who are incapable of so noble a sentiment. The selfish 
cannot feel it: — they will connect themselves with 
others to reap some immediate advantage, but they are 
ever strangers to that regard which frames to itself a 
happiness out of the happiness of others : all their views 
are of profit or of pleasure solely to themselves. Yet 
none are more ready than the selfish to give the colour- 
ing of friendship to all their actions ; because they know 
this to be the most likely means of securing the return 
of greater benefits than they yield. 

It is to be observed* that not only the sentences 
belonging to the same paragraph should seem to 
grow out of each other, but the paragraphs them- 
selves should have some kind of relation, more than 
that of merely treating of the same subject. There- 
fore, though the foregoing paragraph may not be 
liable to any objection in itself, yet when placed 
5 



Want of Connexion among the Thoughts, 



11 



beside the other, it appears to be defective by not 
being consequent upon what preceded it. This 
fault may be corrected by drawing such a conse- 
quence from the second paragraph as may serve 
for the ground of the third : for example : 

As Friendship is so important towards the happiness 
of life, we cannot be too careful in our choice of friends, 
lest we place a reliance on those who will desert and 
betray us in the hour of difficulty and distress. For 
alas ! many persons pretend to be influenced &c. 

A short sentence may likewise be added to the 
paragraph, to wind it up in correspondence with 
its beginning ; as, 

Against such pretended friendship, let confiding ge-* 
nerosity be ever on its guard. 



Thus it appears, that a Theme ought to be free 
from verbiage — that the parts ought to be pro- 
perly arranged — and that the thoughts should flow 
from, and support each other. Almost every fault 
which the learner will commit, he will find to be a 
deviation from one or the other of these three rules ; 
and therefore the faults which are hereafter noted, 
are not to be considered distinct from those already 
pointed out, but rather as instances of particular 
modes in which the general rules are violated. 



b6 



*2 Begging the Question. 

FOURTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 

Begging the Question, 

In endeavouring to follow up a proposition by 
remarks that agree with, and support it, the learner 
must well consider the nature of each remark, and 
use no other connecting words than such as are 
suitable to its purport ; otherwise the sentences so 
connected will be verbiage : for instance : 

Pride is odious, because it is disliked by all : for it 
produces universal hatred. 

Here the words following because and for, pre- 
tend to be a reason for, and a proof of, what is 
previously asserted, and they only say the same 
thing over again in a different manner. Standing 
thus, they are verbiage ; for they are meant as rea- 
sons, and perhaps sound as such, without being so 
in reality. And as the writer begs that to be al- 
lowed for a proof of the question, which is in fact 
the question itself, he is said to beg the question. 
There would not be the same cause of objection, if 
no pretence were made of giving a reason : as, 

Pride is odious ; — it is disliked by all ; — it produces 
universal hatred. 

To repeat the same proposition in different 
words may occasionally be proper for the sake of 
greater clearness, or of adding circumstances at 
first omitted ; and sometimes a proposition requires 
only this forcible statement, in order to be acknow- 



Explaining a thing by itself. 1 3 

ledged. But when a reason or a proof is proposed 
to be given, the writer must be at the pains of 
seeking one : as 

Pride is odious, because our self-love makes us feel 
it as an injury done to our own importance. 

Or 

Pride is odious ; for all persons shun the society of 
the proud. 

FIFTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 

Explaining a thing by itself : that is, using, in the ex- 
planation of a thing, the same word, or a word having the 
same meaning, as that which stands for the thing to be ex- 
plained. 

This is a fault of the same nature as the last ; 
but as it is, in general, more easily corrected, and 
frequently arises merely from inadvertence, a sepa- 
rate notice of it may be proper. The following 
will be a sufficient example. 

Justice regards both magistrates and private indivi- 
duals. The former show themselves to be influenced 
by it, when they make an equitable distribution of re- 
wards and punishments ; the latter, when they are sin- 
cere in their words, and just in their dealings. 

The words equitable and just cannot serve to 
explain justice ; for having the same meaning, they 
do but repeat the thing which is to be explained. 
Let impartial be substituted for the former word, 



14 Distinction without a Difference. 

and honest for the latter, and the explanation will 
agree with the writer's intention. 

SIXTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 
Distinction without a difference. 
Against this common species of verbiage, one 
or two examples will be a sufficient warning. 

Example 1. 
L propose to consider, first, the evils which arise from 
Procrastination, and then, the miseries we should avoid 
by performing all our duties at their proper time and 
place. 

The writer, if he really means different things, 
must mean " first, the evils of Procrastination, and 
then the benefits of performing" &c. 

Example 2. 
Books are the receptacles of knowledge, and the de- 
positories in which the collected wisdom of ages is 
treasured up. 

Example 3. 

Docility is a readiness to receive instruction, and a 
willing obedience to those who teach. 

In each of these examples, the latter part of the 
sentence does but explain the former, as a noun in 
apposition explains its fellow noun ; and therefore 
the conjunction and, which signifies addition, 
should be omitted : as 



Confounding different Senses of the same Expression. 15 

Books are the receptacles of knowledge — the deposi- 
tories &c. 

Docility is a readiness to receive instruction — a wil- 
ling obedience &c. 

And as adding what is no addition always 
amounts to a distinction without a difference, so 
likewise does disjoining what is not distinct ; as 

Example 4. 
To be neither merciful nor compassionate is unsuita- 
ble to the nature of man. 

Here the writer ought to say " Not to be com- 
passionate is" &c. 

The fault opposite to that last noted is, a dif- 
ference without a distinction. This is not a fault 
of verbiage, but is the second general fault, de- 
scribed and exemplified at pages 3, 4, 5, &c. Of 
this the seventh and eighth faults which follow, are 
particular instances; in the same manner as the 
fourth, fifth, and sixth faults just noted, were par- 
ticular instances of the first general fault. 

SEVENTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 

Confounding different senses of the same expression* 
An instance of this error occurs in the following 
remarks : 

To write well is an accomplishment of the first im- 
portance, because we form an immediate judgment of a 



16 Overloading a Sentence. 

person's education from the manner in which he writes. 
If we receive from any one a letter scarcely legible, 
scrawled rather than written, we hardly think well of 
the writer's education, though perhaps the sentiments 
may be tolerably expressed. But if the language is un- 
grammatical, and all the sentences confused ; in short, 
if there appears a total deficiency of skill in the art of 
writing, we immediately conclude that the person is alto- 
gether ignorant and illiterate. 

Here bad writing in the sense of bad penman- 
ship, and in the very different sense of bad com- 
position, are confounded together. The whole 
may be corrected thus : 

To write a fair hand is an accomplishment of much 
importance, because we often form an immediate judg- 
ment of a person's other acquirements from the hand he 
writes. But it is of much more importance to obtain a 
correct and graceful style of expression. The one is a 
manual, the other, a mental art. If we receive from 
any one a letter scarcely legible, scrawled rather than 
written, we hardly think well of the writer's education, 
though perhaps the sentiments may be tolerably ex- 
pressed. But if the language is ungrammatical, and the 
sentences confused ; in short, if there appears a total 
deficiency of skill in the art of composition, we &c. 

EIGHTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 

Overloading a Sentence : that is, mingling foreign 
matter with what is the proper business of it. 

Three instances shall be given of this fault i 



Overloading a Sentence. 1 7 

Example 1. 

Courage leads us to face danger without fear ; For- 
titude, to bear calamity without complaining, and is a 
virtue all ought to possess : for being, as we all are, 
born to trouble, afflictions of some kind must fall to 
our lot. 

The proper business of the former part of this 
sentence, was to define fortitude as opposed to 
courage, and that business being completed, the 
sentence should have ended, namely at the word 
complaining. What follows should be not only in 
a different sentence, but should begin a new para- 
graph with the word Fortitude repeated as the no- 
minative to the verb is. For it appears that the 
writer having made his way clear by defining his 
subject, is about to consider its necessity, &c. 

Example 2. 
The high-born, the rich, and the beautiful, are pecu- 
liarly exposed to Flattery; and the sweet incense is 
offered to them in abundance, by those whom all good 
men justly abhor for their deceitful servility. 

This sentence resembles a person who, by try- 
ing to do two things at a time, fails in both. The 
writer purposes to show the dangers arising from 
flattery which attend birth, wealth, and beauty; 
and also to show the baseness of flatterers. These 
two purposes should have been kept distinct ; they 
should not have been attempted even in the same 



18 Overloading a Sentence. 

paragraph, much less in the same sentence. To cor- 
rect the example, we must suppose the two parts 
of the sentence to stand in different divisions of 
the theme : 

The high-born, the rich, and the beautiful, are peculi- 
arly exposed to Flattery. Their favours are eagerly 
sought by multitudes, and every stratagem is employed 
to obtain them. The sweet incense is therefore offered in 
abundance, and is eagerly inhaled, till &c. 

But the Flatterer is justly abhorred by all good men ; 
for the art he uses is deceit and servility. To gain his 
own ends, he scruples not &e. 

Example S. 

We may therefore come to these conclusions 5 — that 
perfect bliss is not to be found in this life, — that our 
felicity consists in the pursuit, much more than in the 
attainment, of our wishes, — and that happiness without 
alloy is reserved for another state of being ; as the fnost 
fortunate of men, when they have reached all they once 
desired, are still in want of something to complete their 
happiness. 

If the writer had previously stated the argu- 
ments necessary to infer the conclusions, the after 
thought in italics is quite out of place : it is either 
superfluous, or it ought to have been brought for- 
ward among the other arguments. 



We come next to notice some particular in- 
stances of the third general fault, namely, Want 



Propos'mg too much. 19 

of Connexion among the Thoughts. This always 
arises when what follows a proposition does not 
strictly agree with, and tend to support it, and 
therefore all imperfect arguments belong to this 
division. But first it will be proper to caution the 
learner how he frames his propositions : hence the 
following may be laid down as the 

NINTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 
Proposing too much. 

A proposition ought not to contain more than 
the arguments are intended to prove. Suppose, 
for instance, that a writer intends, in one division 
of his Theme, to dwell upon the sublimity of As- 
tronomy, he ought not to begin by saying that 
" Astronomy is a noble, an interesting, and a use- 
ful science," but only say that " it is sublime, no- 
ble, and interesting." 

A writer should be careful of even seeming to 
promise too much, lest his remarks fall short of 
the expectation that precedes them. Therefore, 
in a theme, all high-sounding transitions or intro- 
ductions should be avoided. Suppose, for in- 
stance, that a writer, after a few remarks on the 
sublimity of Astronomy, were to proceed thus : 

Having thus described and illustrated, to the best of 
my abilities, the sublime thoughts, reflections, and 
emotions, to which the noble science of Astronomy 



20 Forgetting the Proposition. 

gives birth, I shall next proceed to show, that this study 
is not less useful to man, than it is sublime and in- 
teresting. 

All this is ponderous and disproportionate. It 
might suit the end of one book or chapter, or the 
beginning of another, in a voluminous Treatise on 
Astronomy, but cannot be proper in a short essay. 
The writer needs only have said, " But the study 
of Astronomy is as useful as it is sublime :" and 
should then have proceeded at once to show its 
uses. 

TENTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 

Forgetting the Proposition. 

Of this error, the following instance may suf- 
fice: 

Anger has been called a short madness ; and people 
of the weakest understandings are the most subject to 
it. It is remarkable that when a disputant is in the 
wrong, he tries to make up in violence what he wants in 
argument. This arises from his pride. He will not own 
his error, and because he is determined not to be con- 
victed of it, he falls into a passion. 

Here, instead of going on to show why Anger 
has been called a short madness, the writer wan- 
ders into reflections which have no necessary con- 
nexion with the particular proposition. He should 
have reasoned thus : 

Anger has been called a short madness. To be con- 



Discoursing short of the Proposition* 21 

vinced that the appellation is just, let us look to the 
effects of anger. It disturbs a man's judgment, so that 
he inflicts an injury on his dearest friend, whom, the 
next moment, he loads with caresses. It makes him 
run headlong into dangers, which, if his mind were 
clear, he would be the first to see and avoid. It is 
true that anger does not always disturb the mind to this 
degree, but that it always disturbs the mind in a degree 
proportioned to its violence, is certain ; and therefore it 
may be justly characterized as a madness. 

ELEVENTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 
Discoursing short of the proposition. 
This fault arises from regarding a subject in 
some partial point of view which happens to be 
familiar to the writer, instead of regarding it in 
the extent implied by the term or terms proposing 
it. Suppose, for instance, that Education were 
proposed ;— a writer would ill suit his remarks to 
the proposition who should proceed in this manner. 

Example 1. 

My opinion of Education is this, that Reading, Writ- 
ing, and Arithmetic, are the groundwork, and that 
English Grammar comes next in importance. A child 
ought to begin French very early, because the pronun- 
ciation of that language is difficult in maturer years. 
I would also recommend attention to the accomplish- 
ments of dancing, drawing, and music ; and above all, 
I would not have needle-work neglected. 



22 Discoursing short of the Proposition. 

The proposition was Education in the universal 
sense of the term, and the arguments should there- 
fore have been of universal application. 

My opinion of Education is this, that it is then only 
just when it fits the individual for his duties. For this 
purpose, both the mind and the body stand in need of 
discipline. The mind must be made acquainted with 
the duties of life, and instructed in all science necessary 
to their performance ; and the body must be formed to 
whatever habits will most effectually conduce to the 
same end. 

All this is applicable, whether we speak of a 
male or a female, a prince or a peasant, a member 
of civilized society, or a savage who lives by hunt- 
ing and fishing; and the arguments, as to their 
extent, therefore agree with the proposition. 

It is true, a writer is not bound to keep, through- 
out the theme, to one view of the subject; but 
whenever his view changes, or whenever he de- 
scends into detail, he is bound to state his purpose, 
and the new proposition, so far as it varies from 
the first, is a change of subject. Nay, at the 
very beginning, a writer may sometimes modify 
the general proposition. Thus, in the Theme at 
page 7, the writer does not take up the subject 
quite in the universal sense in which it is pro- 
posed ; but the sentences at the beginning are a 
sufficient indication of the view he proposes for 



Discoursing short of the Proposition. 23 

himself. Indeed, this business of generalizing * is 
a task of so much difficulty to those whose con- 
clusions have scarcely ever reached beyond par- 
ticulars, that an expedient for avoiding it must 
sometimes be permitted, if at all reconcileable with 
the rules of argument. The nature of such an 
expedient may be shown, by a mode of correcting 
the following example, which has the same fault 
as Example 1. 

Example 2. 

It is from industry that all the blessings of life arise. 
Abilities however humble, if brought forward by study 
and diligently exercised, will at length place the pos- 
sessor in the ranks of honour among the cleverest of 
his companions ; in the same manner as a barren soil, 
by the incessant labour of the husbandman, is made as 
productive as that which is naturally fertile. 

Here the learner does not contemplate the ef- 
fects of industry at large, but only so far as his 
own observation is in the habit of extending. It 
is most likely that a view of the blessings of indus- 
try, resembling that which begins at line 43 of 
Thomson's Autumn, is beyond his power, because 
beyond his experience; or, if within his know- 
ledge, he knows not where to find those general 
expressions wbich shall express them at once, 
without descending to endless detail. In place, 

* See Chapter II. on this subject. 



24 Discoursing wide of the Proposition. 

therefore, of arguments reaching to the whole 
extent of the proposition, he has merely brought 
forward a particular instance. But a particular 
instance may be used as a proof of a general pro- 
position, on the presumption, that, if the propo- 
sition is true in this one respect, it is true in all 
others; and thus any more extensive arguments 
may be avoided. The example will therefore 
stand sufficiently corrected as follows : 

It is from Industry that all the blessings of life arise. 
On every side, we see this truth confirmed by number- 
less examples. For instance, with regard to young 
learners, we cannot but be sensible that abilities, how- 
ever humble, &c. 

TWELFTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 
Discoursing wide of the proposition. 

This fault arises from an indistinct view of the 
subject. Hence the writer, instead of using ar- 
guments which agree with the proposition, and 
with nothing else, employs such as agree with 
some general proposition under which the parti- 
cular one is included : — he resembles a person who 
shoots toward the mark, but does not take aim 
precisely at it. 

Example 1. 

Prudence is a sure road to reputation. They who 
are obedient to their parents and teachers when young, 
obtain accomplishments which are of the highest value 
8 



Discoursing wide of the Proposition. 25 

in maturity. As they advance in years, they fear God, 
honour the king, and do to others as they would be 
done by. By this course of conduct, it is probable they 
often miss immediate advantages, such as short-sighted 
cunning people would snatch at ; but they gain what 
is much better, the approbation of their own hearts, 
and finally, the respect and applause of mankind. 

These arguments do not belong to Prudence in 
particular, but to Virtue in general, and would 
accordingly be suitable to this proposition : " Vir- 
tue is the surest road to reputation. They who 
are obedient &c." Arguments suitable to the 
other proposition, will be such as these : 

Prudence is a sure road to reputation. A man whose 
abilities are of a common, or even of an inferior order, 
but who determines cautiously, and chooses the proper 
time and place for all he says and does, will advance 
with certainty, though perhaps slowly. The chief cause 
of his progress will be, the confidence he secures ; for 
all feel the value of his advice, assistance, and agency, 
who knows exactly when to speak, and when to be 
silent, when to act, and when to cease from action. 

In the following example the writer sees his 
subject, but not so clearly as altogether to avoid 
the same fault. 

Example 2. 

Disappointments are a great part of our portion in 
this life. In our infancy we are liable to dreadful acci- 
dents, and must trust entirely to others for safety and 

c 



26 D iscoursing wide of the Proposition . 

preservation. As we grow older, we think we can take 
care of ourselves, and we become confident and pre- 
suming. But almost every day brings with it some 
greater or less misfortune, and thus we are gradually 
taught not to depend entirely upon ourselves, but to put 
our chief trust in God. 

To keep to the point, the writer should have 
proceeded thus : 

Disappointments are a great part of our portion in 
this life. The wishes and hopes even of our childhood, 
are as frequently checked as gratified ; but this may 
seem inevitable because we have not yet acquired suf- 
ficient experience to form proper expectations. As we 
grow older, we think our better judgment enables us 
to calculate less erroneously, and we become confident 
&c. 

An indistinct view of the subject is often be- 
trayed even by a single expression. Suppose a 
writer were treating of Melancholy ; — in urging 
the duty of not giving way to it, he should not 
say, " We are bound to bear the afflictions of 
life with patience," but " with cheerful resignation" 
On the other hand, if he were treating of Fret- 
fulness, then he ought to argue that we are bound 
to bear the afflictions of life with patience. 

THIRTEENTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 
Proving too little. 
One example of this fault may suffice. 



Proving too little. 27 

No man can live a happy life who pursues nothing 
but pleasure. For he will frequently be disappointed 
of his object, though sometimes, perhaps, he may enjoy 
a few hours of mirth and gaiety. And though he pro- 
fessedly applies more closely than others to the chase 
of pleasure, yet he cannot escape those woes of life 
which are the natural inheritance of all mankind. 

These arguments, namely that a man of plea- 
sure is often disappointed, and that he is subject, 
like others, to the natural woes of life, are not 
enough to prove that he may not be a happy 
man ; for the best of men are liable to be disap- 
pointed in many of their views, and are likewise 
subject to the natural woes of life, and yet such 
men are not prevented from enjoying as much 
happiness as this world can yield. The arguments 
which follow are such as should have been em- 
ployed. 

No man can lead a happy life who pursues nothing 
but pleasure. For he will be continually disappointed 
of his object. Not indeed that hours of noisy mirth 
or wanton gaiety may not often fall to his share ; but 
these will confer no real enjoyment, because they will 
want the inward approval of the heart and the con- 
science. And even on the hollow gladness of these 
hours, languor and satiety will make daily inroads, till 
at last, nothing will be left but disgust and pain. 



c2 



28 Proving too much. 

FOURTEENTH FAULT TO BE AVOIDED. 

Proving too much. 

One example of this fault may likewise be suf- 
ficient. 

No man can live a happy life who pursues nothing 
but pleasure. For it is in the nature of things, that 
when a man gives up his mind to one pursuit, it becomes 
tiresome. Therefore, people who are always following 
after pleasure, do not take delight in it, but, on the 
contrary, pass a troubled, uneasy, dissatisfied life. 

Here the argument goes beyond the mark. It 
is not true that any pursuit which engrosses the 
mind becomes tiresome ; for then the continued 
pursuit of virtue, of wisdom, of knowledge, and 
of all other excellent things, would become tire- 
some: but the assertion is true with regard to 
pleasure, and therefore the argument should have 
been stated in the following manner: 

No man can live a happy life who pursues nothing 
but pleasure. For such is the nature of pleasure, that 
when pursued to the exclusion of serious occupations, 
it no longer produces the effect desired from it; it 
then changes its very essence, and becomes disgust and 
pain. 



CHAPTER II. 



ON GENERALIZING. 

One chief thing which young theme-writers have 
to acquire, is, the ability to reason on general no- 
tions and from general principles. This is an ex- 
ercise of the mind to which they have been little 
accustomed. During our very early years, we 
never reason — we cannot reason, but on particular 
or individual things, because these, and these 
only, come under the actual cognizance of our 
senses : — to form general notions from what we 
observe in these particular instances, is the work 
of the ripening understanding, and therefore the 
work of time ; it forms indeed the main object of 
our education. But at length, having gathered a 
number of these general notions, and formed a 
number of general conclusions, and having learned 
how to express them, we are then in a condition 
to reason from th$m. It is true that, long before 
this, young persons make use of general terms in 
their discourse, but it is for the most part with a 
particular application. Thus, when they talk of 

c3 



30 On Generalizing. * 

an animal, it is of some particular animal; of 
beauty, it is of beauty in some particular instance ; 
of an action, it is of some particular action ; of 
benevolence, it is of some particular act of bene- 
volence. It by no means follows, because they 
make use of the general terms, that they argue 
from general notions of an animal, of beauty, of 
an action, and of benevolence : on the contrary, 
it is by the constant application of the terms 
with reference to particular instances, that they 
arrive, at length, at the general notions, for which, 
as well as for every particular instance, the words 
have been determined to stand. 

Nov/ when young persons are put to the writing 
of themes, it is presumed they are sufficiently 
conversant with particular truths to feel the force 
of a great number of general propositions, and 
also to form them of themselves. This was meant 
at page 1, where it is said that the employment of 
young persons in the early stages of their educa- 
tion, is to collect materials for thinking, and that 
in writing themes, they are to bring these mate- 
rials into use. It was also said that language is 
the instrument of thinking : — it is so in all rea- 
soning on general notions and from general prin- 
ciples ; for it is by means of language we designate 
those general notions that include so many indi- 
vidual things, and form those general propositions 
that include so many individual truths. 

Two things, then, appear to be necessary toward 



On Generalizing. 31 

the art of generalizing; — first, an extensive ac- 
quaintance with individual truths in order to form 
general notions and conclusions ; and secondly, a 
skilful use of language in order to express them. 
As to the first of these requisites, it must be left 
to that gradual improvement which is the result 
of observation continually extending ; toward 
which improvement, it is presumed the exercise it- 
self of writing themes will be a material excitement. 
As to the second requisite, that may likewise be 
expected as a consequence of the learner's pro- 
gress in the usual branches of school discipline. 
For a great share of the instruction he receives, 
is directed to language ; and therefore it seems 
almost inevitable, that while he is extending his 
knowledge of things, he should not be learning a 
more extensive application of words, till those 
which at first he never used but with a view to 
individual instances, he comes at last to under- 
stand, and to make use of, in their widest sense. 
Nevertheless, as dexterity in the use of general 
terms, is acquired, like other things, by practice, 
and as, in beginning to write themes, he is quite 
behind-hand in this respect, we shall often find 
him at a loss for suitable expressions, though per- 
haps the general conclusion he wishes to draw, or 
the class of things he. seeks to designate, may, 
in his own mind, be sufficiently clear. 

Suppose, for instance, a young person has dis- 
covered that the rays of the sun concentrated by 

c 4 



32 On Generalizing. 

the magnifying glass which he holds in his hand, 
will set fire to the piece of paper which he also 
holds in his hand. This is a particular truth. 
But he afterwards ascertains, or probably infers 
at once from this particular experiment, that it 
will set fire to straw, wood, and many other things. 
This is a general conclusion. How shall he ex- 
press it at once, without running into endless de- 
tail, or using an awkward et cetera, which, how- 
ever proper in catalogues, ought never to find 
place in a theme? A little assistance from his 
teacher will perhaps be necessary before he states 
his proposition thus : 

The rays of the sun, concentrated by a magnifying 
glass, will set fire to inflammable substances. 

Suppose again, that, to caution a fellow student 
against the fault exemplified at pages 15, 16, he 
had said to him, before he began his exercise, Do 
not confound the two senses of the verb, to write. 
This is a rule for that word in particular : — how 
shall it be made general ? — Do not confound two 
senses of a word? This will not do, because 
some words may have more than two senses. 
Here, again, the assistance of the teacher might 
be needful, before it occurs to the pupil to write 
thus : 

Do not confound different senses of the same word. 

Suppose, once more, that having occasion to 
speak of beauty, the theme-writer had said that 



On Generalizing. S3 

it soon fades. He might afterwards form a more 
general conclusion of the same kind, by including 
in his notion, power, wealth, and grandeur ; but 
then the word fades will not be equally applica- 
ble to each of those words, and some more com- 
prehensive term must be sought, again very likely 
with the aid of the teacher, before the proposition 
is stated after this manner : 

Power, wealth, grandeur, and beauty, are perishable 
possessions. 

Though practice is necessary to give the learner 
an apt and ready application of general terms, yet 
his improvement in this respect will be materially 
forwarded, by remarking to him, as often as occa- 
sions occur, the various degrees of comprehen- 
siveness in different words, and also, how far some 
of them are more or less comprehensive in strictly 
philosophical, than in popular use. To begin, 
for instance, with the word being; in philosophi- 
cal use, this is the most comprehensive of all 
names ; it includes every other possible name ex- 
cept its opposite, non-entity or not being. How- 
ever, in popular language, (and this the theme- 
writer must follow,) when a term of equal com- 
prehensiveness is required, we generally employ 
some such words or phrases as occur in the fol- 
lowing sentences : 

Whatever we think of, can be expressed by words. 

c5 



34 On Generalizing, 

In reasoning on different things, we should always 
have improvement in view. 

The subjects of discourse are infinite. 

Philosophers apply the word, being, to every possible 
object. 

Next in comprehensiveness are the philoso- 
phical names, substance and mode. But in com- 
mon speech, instead of saying bodily and spiritual 
substances, into which the notion of substance ts 
philosophically divisible, we should probably say, 
bodily and spiritual creatures or beings ; for sub- 
stance, in common language, gives a notion of 
materiality. Material beings are animate or inani- 
mate ; a naturalist would say, are animals, vegeta- 
bles, or minerals. Animals comprehend the seve- 
ral genera (the plural number of the word genus 
or kind) man, beast, bird, fish, insect; and each 
genus comprehends its several species or sorts; 
(species also in the singular ;) and thus we might 
proceed downwards till we reached individuals. 
With respect to the name man, it is to be ob- 
served that, in its most general sense, it includes 
both male and female ; and therefore the pronoun 
he, in its general sense, also includes the meaning 
of she. 

As to mode — in common speech if we had occa- 
sion to refer to all that it includes, we should pro- 
bably say, the attributes and properties of things. 
When the notion is less comprehensive, a variety 



On Generalizing. 35 

of expressions are in use ; of which the following 
examples may serve as some guide to the learner : 

The essential and accidental properties of things, 
ought to be distinguished. 

It is not sufficient to consider a thing in itself: we 
should also consider its several relations to other things. 

Good and bad qualities are to be found in all persons, 
and in all things. 

The qualifications (or the requisites) for happiness in 
this^life, are also those for happiness in the next. 

The sight of verdure, the sound of a harp, the taste 
of honey, the smell of a rose, and the feel of velvet, 
are agreeable sensations. 

To see, to hear, to taste, to smell, to feel, are all ex- 
pressed by one general word, to perceive. 

To conceive, to reflect upon, to judge, to know, to 
will, to imagine, and all other operations of the mind, 
are expressed by one general word, to think. 

Such are the hints, (for they pretend to be no 
other) which are offered to the learner on the 
subject of general terms. His own observation 
in reading, and practice in writing, must supply 
what is deficient in the assistance here afforded. 

Before concluding the chapter, it seems neces- 
sary to warn the inexperienced reasoner of the 
confusion which will often arise in his mind from 
having to do with what are called moral univer- 
salities. A moral universal is that which is not 
strictly universal, but is universal according to the 
custom of things ; (for moral, in this application 

c6 



36 On Generalizing. 

of the word, agrees with the Latin word, mos, 
custom, from which it is derived.) Now almost 
all the general propositions which occur in rea- 
soning on common topics, are of the nature here 
described : few of them are strictly or completely 
true # , and yet they may be true to the full ex- 
tent required by the argument. Thus, for in- 
stance, we may safely affirm that Men are what 
their education makes them ; for though we may 
recollect many men who have been accomplished 
or ignorant, virtuous or wicked, in spite of a good 
or a bad education, yet the proposition is never- 
theless true to as full an extent, as, in a general 
argument, can be demanded. Thus, too, we may 
assert that Diseases arise from intemperance ; for 
though we may know many persons of the most 
temperate lives who are afflicted with disease, yet 
the opposite instances, if we knew them to a pro- 
portionate extent, would far outbalance the for- 
mer ; nay, the former instances may not even be 
exceptions to the general proposition, if we look 
at large to the effects of intemperance, as de- 
scending to generations of men, and do not con- 
fine our view to individuals. This wide and 
sweeping manner of considering things, which 
leaves particular exceptions out of the question, 
is, for reasons already given, no easy task to 

* Physically or metaphysically true, would have been more 
scientific words in this place, but they are yet to be explained. 



On Generalizing. 37 

young minds : the exceptions have an undue mag- 
nitude in their eyes, nor can any thing reduce 
them to their real proportion, but a longer expe- 
rience of the instances which go toward forming 
the general truth. In the mean time, it is hoped 
that this hint, which defines the difficulty, and 
points out its cause, will not be thrown away. 



CHAPTER III. 



ARGUMENTS, AND THEIR SEVERAL KINDS, EX- 
PLAINED. 

An argument is a truth real or presumed, which 
is brought forward to infer that something else is 
true ; as, " Man is a creature endowed with rea- 
son and liberty ; therefore he is accountable for 
his actions." A conclusion which is only in the 
mind of him who forms it, is termed a judgment ; 
when expressed in words it is termed a proposi- 
tion. Thus, man is accountable for his actions^ 
is a proposition : — it is proposed in order that its 
truth may be acknowledged by others. But hav- 
ing been a conclusion from something else before 
it was proposed, it may be necessary to state what 
led to it, and this, if stated, is the argument. 

Here, however, a proper query arises. What 
is used for an argument is always another propo- 
sition ; and granting it to be just so far as it infers 
the conclusion, whence does the proposition which 
is used for the argument, derive its support ? In 



Arguments explained. 39 

most cases, perhaps, it is also, in its turn, a just 
inference from some other proposition. Still, in 
tracing it downwards, if its support be not altoge- 
ther visionary, we must come to something which 
is true of itself, and not an inference, — something 
on which all argument ultimately rests. Now 
this ultimate ground can consist of nothing but 
particular or individual truths, for which we have 
the evidence of our senses or of our conscious- 
ness,— if not of our own senses or consciousness, 
at least of theirs whose testimony we believe. 
When we have arrived at this ground, we can go 
no further : we must assent, if ourselves witness ; 
we may believe or disbelieve, if others witness ; but 
all argument is at an end. These particular truths 
are named facts, and when we communicate them 
in discourse, we are not said to argue, but to nar- 
rate or describe. 

If there are sentences expressing truths that 
seem to rest on their own basis, and yet are of a 
nature different from those that narrate facts, such 
difference will be found to exist rather in the 
expression than in reality, or at least the proposi- 
tion will be found to have arisen from single and 
individual instances : for example : It is impossi- 
ble for the same thing to he and not to be. The 
whole is greater than its part. These proposi- 
tions teach no more than we learned from the 
first single instance we met with, and the instance 
and the proposition may therefore be deemed the 



40 Arguments explained. 

same ; or if this explanation will not be admitted, 
at least must it be said that the instance led to the 
proposition, not the proposition to the instance ; 
in other words, we knew not the truth till an 
occasion made it known. Another, and a different 
kind of example is afforded by the proposition 
used as an argument above, — Man is a creature 
endowed with reason and liberty. That this pro- 
position does not narrate a single or particular 
truth is certain ; but yet it derives its evidence 
from such truths ; for, in reality, it does not rest 
on its own basis antecedent to previous proof, but 
is known to be true only through experience. Ex- 
perience has made us know that each man is en- 
dowed with reason and liberty, and through this 
experience alone, that is, through the evidence of 
single truths, are we compelled to admit the gene- 
ral truth. Had experience been wanting, we could 
not have been convinced of it, but by being con- 
ducted to individual truths and the evidence of 
facts, and these would have formed the argument 
for arriving at the general conclusion. This 
method of proof is called Induction ; and the 
reasoner must always employ it to establish a 
general truth, unless experience has already esta- 
blished it by the same means. — Among proposi- 
tions that evidently stand on their own basis be- 
cause they narrate facts, are such obvious instances 
as these : / am reading. There was once a famous 
conqueror named Alexander. The first has the 



Arguments explained. 41 

evidence of our own senses and consciousness ; 
the second, the evidence of testimony, and both 
are manifestly independent of all argument. But 
propositions like the following also stand on their 
own basis, and for the same reason : A circle is 
such a figure, that all lines drawn from a certain 
point within it to the circumference, are equal to 
one another. Maliciously hilling a man is murder. 
If, in the first of these propositions, it were intended 
to be said, that all figures called circles are per- 
fect according to the conditions laid down ; or if, 
in the second, that the word murder is never used 
but precisely in the sense assigned to it, neither of 
the propositions would by any means be evident : 
but if the proposer only refers to the notion of a 
circle or of murder which he has in his mind, we 
can have no cause to doubt him, when he says he 
applies the word to that notion, and to nothing 
else. In advancing the proposition he merely 
narrates a fact, the evidence of which is his own 
consciousness, and we receive it on his testimony. 
Such, then, is the evidence of propositions that 
have not arisen from antecedent truths, but rest 
on their own basis. We now come to a second 
query. Granting what has been shewn, that na- 
ture places many truths at once before us, and 
leaves others to be formed in the mind at will, 
how do these become the means of inferring other 
truths ? or, whence does a proposition derive its 
power of inferring another proposition ? An in- 



42 Arguments explained. 

ference cannot be the original and necessary ap- 
pendage of a proposition ; for then they would 
always have been apprehended together, and 
would, from the beginning, have been one truth, 
not two. It is through the light which different 
known truths throw on each other, that they be- 
come the means of inferring new truths. A fact 
by itself can infer nothing, but two facts may 
throw a light on each other, and a conclusion en- 
sue. Suppose we wish to prove that a person 
lived in London, it would be no argument to say 
he lived with his father, unless it were previously 
known that his father lived in London, and then 
it would be an undeniable argument. An argu- 
ment, then, derives its power from something 
previously known: — this is sometimes called, and 
perhaps may always conveniently be called, the 
datum, in the plural number, data, that is the 
thing or things given, or acknowledged, granted, 
conceded ; and it may be some single fact, as the 
last example, or some essential or immutable law 
of nature which we cannot escape knowing as soon 
as we know our own existence, or some general 
truth the result of an induction of particulars ob- 
tained from experience, or some truth laid down 
by the reasoner at will as the condition of his 
argument, or some conclusion out of preceding 
trains of reasoning, or some hypothesis (i. e. sup- 
position) laid down merely for the sake of raising 
an argument upon it. In some of these cases, it 



Arguments exclaimed. 43 

may be proper to state the datum previously to 
using the argument, but in general this is a need- 
less formality, because the argument itself, the 
moment it is used, necessarily presumes the datum. 
Example : John was in London yesterday at mid- 
day ; therefore he was not at York at that time. 
The datum is as follows : John could not be in 
London and York at the same time : which is a 
truth so obvious, that to state it in words seems 
mere trifling. It is to be observed that the degree 
of certainty with which any argument infers its 
conclusion, is always in exact proportion to the 
degree of certainty in the datum. In the last 
example, the datum was a truth belonging to an 
immutable law of nature; hence the inference 
arising from the argument built upon it, is physi- 
cally certain, which means, certain from the con- 
stitution of nature itself, 'physical being derived 
from the Greek word physis, nature. If a datum 
be some law to which perhaps nothing in nature 
completely conforms, but which, as it can be ima- 
gined to be perfectly complied with, the reasoner 
himself lays down as the condition of his argu- 
ment, then the inference arising from the argu- 
ment built upon it, is true even beyond nature, or 
it is meta-physically true : (meta, we are to observe, 
is a Greek preposition signifying beyond :) Exam- 
ple: These lines are radii of the same circle; 
therefore they are equal to one another. For the 
reasoner had laid down this datum in the form of 



44 Arguments explained. 

a definition, that a circle is such a figure that all 
lines (called radii, the plural of radius,) drawn 
from a point within it to the circumference, are 
equal to one another ; so that having shown the 
lines in the argument to be radii of the same cir- 
cle, the conclusion irresistibly follows ; and as the 
perfect circle which exists in his definition, cannot, 
perhaps, be found in nature, the conclusion is said 
to be metaphysically true, or, from the science in 
which this kind of reasoning chiefly prevails, ma- 
thematically true. If a datum be some customary, 
and not an immutable law of nature, then the in- 
ference arising from the argument built upon it, is 
only morally certain, which means certain as far 
as custom or experience can establish it, moral 
being derived from the Latin word mos, custom. 
Example : He combats with six men ; therefore he 
will be overcome. The datum is this : One man 
must be overcome by six. We can have no cause 
to doubt this truth ; yet, as customary laws may 
give way in particular instances, neither the datum 
nor the inference is physically, and stirll lejss, meta- 
physically certain. Physical and metaphysical 
certainty are often called, by a general name, de~ 
7no?istrative certainty ; but moral certainty is no- 
thing more than the very highest degree of pro- 
bability ; and it is so dependent on experience, that 
an inference which is morally certain to one, may 
be doubtful to another, till he attains the know- 
ledge on which the argument is grounded. Let it 



Arguments explained* 45 

be supposed, for instance, that a person has died 
soon after drinking of a certain juice : — he who 
knows that drinking the juice has been uniformly 
followed by the same event, will argue and con- 
clude with moral certainty — This person drank 
of the juice ; therefore it was the cause of his 
death; but one whose experience or knowledge 
has not put him in possession of any sufficient 
data, cannot use the argument, nor acknowledge 
it to be an argument when he hears it used. It 
may be further remarked, that to demonstrate a 
truth with physical or metaphysical certainty, we 
must argue from causes which we know at once to 
be essential, and thus be able to infer an effect 
from what is prior to it, (a priori, as it is said,) 
independently of experience ; for in tracing a 
cause from what is posterior (a posteriori, as it is 
said,) there is always a possibility that what we 
think to be the cause, is not so. It is physically 
possible that an event may happen fifty times after 
another by chance ; nor, however great our moral 
certainty of the contrary, can we disprove the pos- 
sibility. Therefore though with regard to the 
existence of a cause wherever there is an effect, 
nothing can be more certain, yet in trying to find 
the cause from the effect, we must be satisfied 
with moral, and not look for demonstrative cer- 
tainty. 

And now, after the preceding account of what 
constitutes an argument, if the learner is desirous 



46 Arguments explained. 

of knowing what is a syllogism, about which so 
much is said in theoretical Logic, he has only to 
write down the datum, the argument, and the in- 
ference of each of the preceding examples, and 
he will have, in each instance, a syllogism, con- 
sisting of the premises, namely, the major and 
minor propositions, followed by the conclusion. 

His father lived in London. 
But he lived with his father. 
Therefore he lived in London. 

John could not be in London and York at the same 
time. 

But John was in London yesterday at mid-day. 
Therefore he was not in York at that time. 

The radii of the same circle are equal to one another. 
But these lines are radii of the same circle. 
Therefore they are equal to one another. 

If one man combats with six, he will be overeome. 
But this man combats with six. 
Therefore he will be overcome. 

This juice has been the cause of death to all who 
have drunk of it. 

But this man drank of it. 

Therefore it was the cause of his death. 

To these examples, the following may be added, 
the datum or major, being, in each, somewhat 
different : 

Every creature endowed with reason and liberty is 
accountable for his actions. 



Arguments explained, 47 

But man is a creature endowed with reason and 
liberty. 

Therefore he is accountable for his actions. 

The universe is a work of chance. 

But it (the universe) displays infinite wisdom of con- 
trivance. 

Therefore a work of chance displays infinite wisdom 
of contrivance. 

In, the former of these two syllogisms, the 
datum or major proposition might be proved by 
argument, and is therefore to be esteemed the 
result of it ; in the last example, the datum is an 
hypothesis, and the conclusion resulting from the 
argument built upon it, is an absurdity ; and thus, 
by what is called reductio ad absurdum, the assumed 
proposition is proved to be false. 

These specimens are given that the learner 
may not be ignorant of what is meant by a syllo- 
gism. However, it is plain that in forming a 
syllogism, many superfluous words are used. A 
proposition put forward as an argument implies its 
datum ; for in presuming it to be an argument, we 
presume the datum which makes it so, and there- 
fore the latter needs not a separate proposition. 
A syllogism thus stripped of one of its premises, is 
called an enthymeme. But in common, practical 
reasoning, even the enthymeme seldom appears in 
its formal shape, that is, with the argument first, 
and then the conclusion introduced by the con- 
junction therefore, as the reader has seen in all 



48 Arguments explained, 

the examples of this chapter. The forms of sen- 
tences are infinite ; and the reasoner is to choose 
that form which he imagines best calculated to put 
other minds in the posture of thought which he is 
conscious to be the posture of his own; and 
though the enthymeme, in its regular shape, per- 
haps best represents the process of thinking by 
which the reasoner arrived at the conclusion he 
seeks to establish, yet it may not so well represent 
the state of his mind when the conclusion is 
formed, nor be best calculated to convey the truth, 
as he apprehends it, to others : he may find it 
most convenient to state the conclusion first, and 
give th£ arguments afterwards, or he may choose 
to comprehend the argument and the conclusion 
in the same sentence ; and, if his purpose requires, 
he may give a figurative turn to the sentence, by 
making it an exclamation or interrogation, instead 
of a plain affirmative. In short, whatever form of 
expression will give a quick and forcible appre- 
hension of the truth, will be a proper way of con- 
veying it. Thus, for example, the truths so labo- 
riously made out in the foregoing syllogisms, may 
be shortly conveyed in some such forms as the 
following : 

He lived in London ; for his father, with whom he 
dwelt, lived there. 

John was not in York yesterday at mid-day : he was 
seen at that very time in London. 



Arguments explained. 49 

These lines are equal to one another, because they 
are radii of the same circle. 

How improbable that, in combating with six men, 
he should not be overcome ! 

He died through drinking of a juice which never 
fails to cause death. 

Man being a creature endowed with reason and 
liberty, is accountable for his actions. 

Can the universe, which displays such infinite wisdom 
of contrivance, be the work of chance ? 

When syllogism and enthymeme are thus re- 
duced into sentences of common form and occur- 
rence, the business of arguing may not seem so 
much of a mystery as to have needed the expla- 
nation which has been given in this chapter ; for 
nothing seems easier than to accompany what we 
believe and utter as true, with considerations that 
make it appear so, after the manner of these exam- 
ples. But it is the apparent facility of arguing, 
that makes so many people bold in attempting it, 
who really understand nothing of the business : — 
they mistake assertion for argument, and positive- 
ness for proof : their discourse is a string of arbi- 
trary assumptions ; and their evidence nothing but 
a repetition of the same things, disguised, perhaps, 
by a different mode of expression, or calculated 
to impose on the mind by being enveloped in 
learned phraseology. Thus the village school- 
master : 



50 Arguments explained. 

In arguing, too, the parson owned his skill, 
For e'en though vanquished, he could argue still ; 
While words of learned length, and thundering sound, 
Amazed the gazing rustics ranged around. 

Goldsmith. 

It is hoped that, after the explanation which has 
been given, the learner will know the nature of an 
argument too well, to attempt to argue before he 
is provided with the proper materials. He will 
know that a real argument, however mixed up in 
the same sentence with the proposition it is in- 
tended to prove or render probable, is always ca- 
pable of being exhibited as a distinct proposition, 
— distinct not in words only, but distinct in mat- 
ter ; since a proposition that is not already evi- 
dent, cannot be made so by being merely repeated 
in sense, however different the words may be ; 
unless indeed it was not understood as expressed 
at first, and that the second mode of expression, 
by making the meaning clear, shows it to be an 
evident truth : — but this is not using an argu- 
ment; — it is only explaining one sentence by ano- 
ther. The learner will also know, that no argu- 
ment can exist, unless there is some ground for 
it, so plain as of necessity to be admitted ; or so 
laid down as to be deemed given ; or so well se- 
cured by previous argument as to be longer ques- 
tionable. It would, for example, be of no use to 
say that two lines are equal to one another, be- 



Arguments explained. $& 

cause they are radii of the same circle, unless it 
were previously admitted or laid down, that the 
radii of a circle are equal. 

But in this place, the learner will naturally in- 
quire, where he is to find the materials, that is, 
the arguments, for the proof of propositions. In 
answer it may be said, that when a reasoning per- 
son makes up his mind that something is true or 
probable, it is never without sufficient evidence ; 
and therefore when he undertakes to state to 
others that it is true or probable, he should be 
prepared to bring forward the evidence to con- 
vince them, by which his own mind is convinced. 
Perhaps he cannot do this effectually, solely from 
want of skill in language and method : if so, he 
has only to practise composition till he acquires 
skill. But the case, it must be confessed, is some- 
thing different, when a proposition or theme is 
given as an exercise ; for it is possible the subject 
may never have been considered by the writer 
before, and then he has to find the arguments 
proper to support it. To fit the learner for this 
exigency, the ancient rhetoricians were accus- 
tomed, in treating of Invention, (a word which is 
derived from the Latin verb invenio, I find,) to lay 
down a number of general heads which they named 
Common Places among which the inexperienced 
orator was to look for the kind of arguments that 
suited his purpose. But all such helps are vain 
to a learner who will not think for himself; and 

d2 



52 The several Kinds of Arguments. 

indeed the only benefit likely to arise from them, 
is a glearer insight into the process of argumenta- 
tion. For the sake, therefore, of acquainting the 
learner with the names and application of the 
principal kinds of argument, the following account, 
taken partly from the common places, and partly 
from other sources, is added. 

DEFINITION. ETYMOLOGY. 

When our arguments to prove the truth of a 
proposition, are drawn from the nature of the 
thing itself, we are said to reason from the Defini- 
tion. Suppose the proposition to be, Pride raises 
hatred: — here, for our argument, we may define 
the nature of Pride, as being a high opinion of 
ones-self, and an undervaluing of others ; we may 
assert that, to remind others of an inferiority 
wounds their self-love ; — that none can brook the 
to?ie, the look, or the gesture, which throws them at 
a distance ; — and thus we may go on exhibiting 
our subject in every point of view, calculated to 
make the proposition it is joined with, more mani- 
fest and convincing than it appeared while it stood 
alone. 

But the learner will observe, that no argument 
can arise from this or any other head, unless we 
are warranted in presuming a ground for the ar- 
gument to rest on. In the foregoing example, 
the ground is, that he who shows a high opinion of 
himself— who undervalues others; — who reminds 



Definition. Etymology. 53 

them of their inferiority, — who wounds their self- 
love, — Sfc. raises their hatred. All this, though 
not expressed to be granted, (datum,) is under- 
stood to be so ; but unless it were of a more mani- 
fest nature than the proposition, Pride raises ha- 
tred, it would be absurd to take it for granted, 
when, by using an argument, it [appears that we 
did not take the proposition for granted. We 
could not say (unless there had been some pre- 
vious reasoning) Pride leads to misery, because it 
is a high opinion of ones-self, an undervaluing of 
others 8fc.; for the ground on which the argument 
is to rest, namely that showing a high opinion of 
one's-self leads to misery, is by no means of a 
more manifest nature than the proposition, Pride 
leads to misery, and therefore we must not presume 
it to be given, unless by some previous argument 
we had established it. 

The argument from Etymology or Derivation, 
takes place when we show the origin of any of the 
words we use, in order to prove our proposition. 
Suppose it to be, The idle who have no work can 
have no play: here we may begin by an argument 
from the definition of play, in which we state that 
play means the same as relaxation, amusement, re* 
creation: — we then bring forward our argument 
from Etymology, in which we show that relaxa- 
tion comes from a Latin verb that signifies to loosen 
what is tight or bent; amusement from words im- 
plying a leaving of the muses, that is, our studies ; 

d3 



54 The several Kinds of Arguments. 

and recreation from a word signifying to make 
fresh or to refresh : — and lastly, by arguing from 
the nature or definition of idleness, we show that 
neither of these words, according to such deriva- 
tive meaning, can be applied to the idle ; for, say 
we, how can he relax, whose mind is never bent ? 
how can he leave the muses, who is never with them? 
how can he refresh from labour, who never encoun- 
ters it # ? 

This example, beside its principal object, may 
serve to show how several arguments are used in 
subservience to each other, in order to form what, 
in a more comprehensive sense, is termed the 
argument ; that is the connected series of proofs 
by which a proposition is established. 

ENUMERATION. SPECIES. 

We reason from Enumeration whenever we 
seek to prove a general proposition, by detailing 
more particularly the truths of which it consists. 
This kind of argument has already been alluded 
to under the name Induction. Suppose the pro- 

* A word agreeing in derivation with another is called its 
conjugate, as justly is a conjugate of just ; and an argument 
is sometimes said to be taken from a conjugate thus : Prop. 
He is just : Argument : for he acts justly. But the argument 
does not hold unless it can be shown that he always acts 
justly, which would amount to a definition of being just. It 
does not appear, therefore, that any valid argument, distinct 
from definition or etymology, can arise from a conjugate. 



Enumeration, Species. 55 

position to be, Industry is the source of all the 
blessings of life : any more particular account of 
the blessings of life, and of the manner in which 
they spring from industry, would be an argument 
under this head # . And that an argument of this 
kind is a valid argument, the principles which 
have been unfolded sufficiently explain ; for, at all 
times, in proportion as we descend from general 
to particular, we draw near to that which is the 
ultimate ground of all argument, namely the evi- 
dence of our senses or of our consciousness. 

The argument from Species takes place when, 
instead of proving a general proposition by an 
enumeration of particulars, we merely give one of 
those particulars as an instance +. An example 
was afforded in the corrected sentence at page 24. 



* When the proposition to be proved does not pretend to 
be a physical or metaphysical universal, it is seldom of con- 
sequence to the argument that the enumeration is not com- 
plete. The argument is good as far as it goes, and even fur- 
ther, if our hearers will carry it further iu their own minds. 
But on scientific subjects, chemistry for instance, when a 
general principle is to be established, it is of consequence 
that none of the particulars of the induction which is used 
to prove it, should be omitted ; one left out, may, when dis- 
covered, overturn the principle altogether. Hence the many 
complete changes of doctrine that have taken place in that 
science within a few years. 

f It is true, as they say in theoretical logic, that universals 
are not contained in particulars, and therefore cannot be in- 
ferred from them ; nor, in reasoning under this head, is it 
affirmed that the particular contains the universal, but that 
D 4 



56 The several Kinds of Arguments* 

GENUS. 

In reasoning from this head, we pursue a con- 
trary course from that which is pursued in rea- 
soning from Induction ; for instead of arriving at 
a general truth through a number of particular 
truths, we infer, from a general truth, any particu- 
lar truth that comes under it ; a mode of reason- 
ing extremely common in theoretical logic ; as, in 
order to show that man is mortal, we go to the 
genus of which man is the species, and give as our 
argument that man is an animal : or, to arrange 
the whole in due form, Evert/ animal is mortal ; 
but man is an animal ; therefore man is mortal. 
There seems at first but little use in this kind of 
argument, since it does not lead beyond what is 
already admitted ; for suppose a person already 
knows all that is included in the major proposi- 
tion or datum, (and unless he knows it, he is not 
competent to receive the second as a categorical 
argument *,) then he already knows the conclusion 
without the formality of the argument, inasmuch 
as the conclusion is contained in the datum. It is 
however very useful in order to remind a person, 

the particular is an instance of what is contained in the uni- 
versal, from whence, with common candour, the rest of what 
is contained, may be allowed. 

* We may admit an argument hypothetically, i. e. on sup- 
position, without having any ground to admit it categorically, 
i, e. absolutely* 



Genus. Adjuncts* Cause, tyc. 57 

during the course of arguing, of what he must 
admit ; — it is also useful as the plan of a series of 
arguments, when one or both of the first two pro- 
positions not being evident, are taken as the points 
to be proved in order to infer the last ; — and it is 
likewise used when, in treating on a particular 
subject, we employ arguments that belong not to 
that subject only, but to all of the same kind. 
Thus in a theme on Music, the reasoner might 
use arguments that apply to all the fine arts, in 
order that a conclusion (though it might not be 
formally stated) should be drawn for Music in 
particular: as, 

It is futile to inquire what gave occasion to the origin 
of Music. The seeds of the fine arts are sown by na- 
ture in the heart of man, and nothing is at any time 
wanting to bring them forth, but the summer of peace 
and leisure. Speaking as we speak of an instrument 
not hitherto in use, or a substance not hitherto com- 
pounded, it cannot be said that any of them were in- 
vented : no ; the fine arts grew up and flourished spon- 
taneously, it being as natural for man to become a poet, 
a painter, a sculptor, or a musician, as to become a war- 
rior or a statesman. (All that is here said of the fine 
arts in general, is intended for Music in particular.) 

ADJUNCTS. ANTECEDENTS. CONSEQUENTS. CAUSE. 
EFFECT. 

We reason from one or other of these heads, 
whenever we bring forward any of the things that 

d5 



58 The several Kinds of Arguments. 

have, or that we affirm to have, a real connexion 
with our subject, in order, from the nature of such 
connexion, to make the truth of our proposition 
more evident or probable. 

Thus if we wished to prove that Livi?ig in 
town is occasionally to be 'preferred to living in the 
country ; we might show that in town we may find 
various society collected from all parts, by mixing 
with which, we are able to get a knowledge of the 
world; that here the best instructors are also to be 
met with in all the branches of science; and that 
here are likewise collected the best specimens of all 
that is excellent in art. On the other hand, if we 
wished to prove the superiority of a country life, 
we might show that it is more healthy, more peace- 
able, and less exposed to the dangers of temptation. 
These, with other Adjuncts belonging to the re- 
spective subjects, might be the arguments. 

Again, if we wished to prove the proposition, 
God reserves a complete distribution of rewards and 
punishments for the next ivorld, we might show it 
to be a consequent of these Antecedents, that He 
is just, but that in this world He often permits the 
wicked to triumph, and the virtuous to suffer. And 
if we wished to prove the proposition Pria]e leads 
to misery, we might show it to be true by these 
Consequents — universal hatred— frequent mortifica- 
tions — the absence of all sympathy when in distress ; 
and so forth. 

Also, if our proposition were, Man is account- 



Similitude. Comparison. Contraries. 59 

able for his actions, we might shew it to be true 
(a priori as it is said) by stating the Cause of his 
being accountable, namely the possession of rea- 
son and liberty. And if we had to show that 
Living always in a crowded city is not wholesome ; 
we might prove it ( a posteriori as it is said) by the 
Effect, namely a weakly frame of body. 

We sometimes argue from the Efficient, and 
sometimes from the Final cause. Suppose dur 
proposition, Worldly pleasures give less and less 
delight the more they are pursued; — the efficient 
Cause is the nature of man, or the nature of those 
pleasures : (it may be stated either way :) the final 
Cause, or the end which this constitution of things 
has in view, is, that man may be weaned from 
worldly pleasures, and cease to set his heart on 
the delights of this transitory scene, when he 
ought to be preparing for those of eternity. 

SIMILITUDE. COMPARISON. CONTRARIES. 

We reason from one or other of these heads, 
whenever we bring forward things that have no 
real connexion with our subject, but which make 
our proposition more evident, striking, or proba- 
ble, by being exhibited to the mind at the same 
time with it. 

Thus the proposition, A good example is of most 
use when put forth by people of superior rank, — 
becomes more evident when we bring forward the 
Similitude — in the same manner as a light shines 

d6 



60 The several Kinds of Arguments. 

furthest when placed on high. This is sometimes 
called, reasoning from Analogy. 

And it may be observed in this place, that figu- 
rative language, though generally considered to 
be used for the sake of ornament, is employed 
quite as much for the sake of argument. Thus 
when we say, Novels in general only serve to poison 
the mind, we include an argument in the proposi- 
tion ; for the whole expressed at full would be 
thus : Novels in general are very injurious to the 
mind ; for they work the same kind of effect upon it, 
that poisons work upon the body. 

Arguing from Similitude and from Comparison, 
is usually understood to mean the same ; but we 
are more properly said to reason from Comparison, 
when we bring an admitted proposition of the 
same kind as that which we seek to enforce, and 
place it by its side, in order that the latter may 
receive greater credence. If the adduced pro- 
position exceeds in force the one we intend to 
prove, we are said to reason a fortiori, i. e. from 
the stronger proposition ; if the adduced proposi- 
tion agrees in force, we are said to reason from a 
parallel truth or from Analogy, or to conclude 
from the parity of the case ; and if the propor- 
tion it bears to the other is variable in different 
particular instances, we may affirm a general pro- 
portionate inference. 

Thus, in order to enforce the truth, that a man 
ought to be forgiving towards his friends, we may 



Similitude. Comparison. Contraries. 61 

adduce the stronger proposition that he ought to 
forgive even his enemies, and from this stronger 
proposition fa fortiori) we shall conclude with so 
much the more force concerning the weaker *. — 
If we wish to shew that the indolent cannot obtain 
the favour of Heaven, we may adduce the parallel 
or analogous proposition, the idle servant cannot be 
the favourite of his master. And if we wish to 
prove that they who give way to wickedness are 
unhappy, we may state our argument and conclu- 
sion thus : As a mind full of vice is a mind full of 
misery, so all are unhappy in proportion as they 
give way to wickedness. 

We reason from Contraries in this manner ; 
Suppose we wish to place in a stronger light the 
truths, that vice is the source of disquiet, that it 
leads to infamy here, and punishment hereafter, 
we may take the contrary truths and say, As vir- 
tue promotes peace of mind, so vice is the parent 
of disquiet ; as virtue attracts honour and reputa- 
tion, so vice brings infamy and reproach ; as virtue 
paves a road to bliss hereafter, so vice leads to 
eternal punishment. 

* This argument is often expressed merely by an emphasis. 
Thus, if the following sentence is pronounced without any 
particular emphasis, it merely narrates a fact: / cannot treat 
a dog ill. But if we pronounce it with the stronger of the 
two emphatic inflexions on the last word but one, it is an 
argument a fortiori, intended to prove the implied weaker 
proposition, / cannot treat my fellow-creatures ill. See the 
Author's Theory of Elocution, page 103 e 



62 The several Kinds of Arguments. 

Such are the internal topics or sources whence 
arguments are taken for the proof of propositions. 
They are called internal, because they arise at 
once from a consideration of the subject, and are 
invented or found by the writer or orator within 
limits to which all who consider the subject, have 
access in common. But there are external topics 
of no small importance for the proof of proposi- 
tions, and these are, 

TESTIMONIES. SINGULAR EXAMPLES. 

They are said to be borrowed from without, 
for they are such as the writer or orator chances 
to have met with, and not such as he finds upon 
the common ground appertaining to his subject. 
A testimony is the deposition of others, according 
with our own, and the testimonies usually em- 
ployed in Themes, are Proverbs, Sayings of emi- 
nent men, and Quotations from authors of reputa- 
tion. A singular example is some fact that had 
witnesses to it, and not one which the writer 
imagines as one of a species. All historical facts 
are of this nature, and all that ourselves witness, 
or our co-temporaries : these, as it has been shewn, 
are ultimate arguments, below which it is impossi- 
ble to descend. 



The learner is now acquainted with the distinc- 
tion of arguments arising from the different places 



Argumentum ad Judicium, fyc. 63 

whence they are taken. But there is another 
cause of distinction among them, namely the dif- 
ferent ground or data on which they rest. When 
an argument has for its ground or datum any truth 
being part of the knowledge or experience of man- 
kind at large, it is called Argumentum ad judicium, 
i. e. an argument [addressed] to [all men's] judg- 
ment. There are few arguments on common sub- 
jects that do not come under this designation, and 
almost all that have been exemplified in this chap- 
ter belong to it. 

An argument grounded on knowledge that does 
not belong to mankind at large, but only to some 
who have been made acquainted with it, or fore- 
warned that such are the conditions of the reason- 
ing, may be called an argument to the learned, or 
the initiated: as, This inclining column does not 
fall, because the line of direction is within the 
base. These lines are equal to one another, be- 
cause they are radii of the same circle. 

Where an argument takes for its ground the 
peculiar principles which a man professes, it is 
called argumentum ad hominem, L e. an argument to 
the [peculiar] man. If, for example, we wished 
to recommend a virtuous life to one who would 
listen to no argument from, duty, but professed 
himself actuated only by a love of pleasure, we 
might rest our arguments on his own ground, and 
by them prove, that a virtuous life is a life of 
more real pleasure than any other. 



64* The several Kinds of Arguments. 

When we rest our argument on an acknow- 
ledgment of the authenticity, and on a consequent 
reverence, of the source whence it is derived, it is 
termed argumentum ad verecundiam, i. e. an argu- 
ment [addressed] to [men's] reverence or respect. 
This is the presumed ground of testimonies, and 
of singular examples. And when in reasoning 
with Christians, we rest it on some fact of Scrip- 
ture, it is called argumentum adjidem. 

To the names of argument here explained, are 
sometimes added argumentum ad ignorantiam, an 
argument to [our hearers'] ignorance ; and argu- 
mentum ad passio?ies, an argument to the passions. 
The former of these means nothing more than a 
proposition, or a series of propositions, which we 
require our hearers to admit, not because we can 
prove them, but because they have not the skill 
or knowledge to disprove them ; and the second 
means a proposition, or a series of propositions, 
not calculated to convince thinking minds, but to 
awaken the passions of the multitude. Neither of 
these can indeed be called an argument, in the 
strict sense in which the word has been used in 
most parts of this chapter. 



There is likewise a distinction of arguments 
arising from the several forms in which they are 



Syllogism, Enthymeme. Epichirema. 65 

expressed. It is, however, only to some of these 
forms that peculiar names are applied. We have 
seen that when the datum, the argument, (properly 
so called,) and the conclusion, are formally arrang- 
ed, the three propositions taken together, are 
called a Syllogism*. We have also seen, that 
when the datum is omitted, the argument with its 
conclusion form what is called an Enthymeme. 
Under the topic Genus, an allusion was likewise 
made to the form of argument called Epichirema, 
which consists of a series of arguments having a 

* And a Syllogism is simple or complex, the former, ac- 
cording to its numerous varieties, distinguished by the ap- 
palling names — Barbara, Celarent, &c. — Cesare, Camestres, 
&c. — Darepti, Felapton, &c, — determined by the fiyure of 
the Syllogism, and its quantity and quality ; — the figure de- 
pending on the manner of comparing the ideas, (as logicians 
explain the matter,) and the quantity and quality being the 
universal or particular, the affirmative or negative meaning, 
of the premises and conclusion. There was a time when skill 
in Logic was supposed to consist in being able to ring the 
changes with these modes and figures of Syllogisms. Watts 
ventured to speak of them somewhat slightingly in his Logic, 
though he would not altogether omit them, lest his book 
should be thought imperfect. Duncan entirely neglects 
them ; and Mr. Dugald Stewart affirms, that the logical doc- 
trine about the comparison of ideas, bears, a closer analogy 
to the task of a schoolboy in parsing his lesson, than to any 
analysis of a higher kind. See Philosophical Essays, Essay V. 
Chap. 1. Authority, however, goes a great way, and many 
of the learned are unwilling to think cheaply of an invention 
that sprung from Aristotle, 



66 The several Kinds of Arguments. 

syllogism for its outline, and proving the two pre- 
mises in order to infer the conclusion # . To the 
mention of these is to be added the Dilemma, 
which is a form of reasoning that reduces the 
thing to be proved to an alternative, and shows 
it to be true either way. Suppose our proposi- 
tion to be — We cannot be free from pain or sorrow 
in this life: — Reasoning upon the datum that in 
this life we all have wicked inclinations, we propose 
our alternative, that either we must obey our vicious 
inclinations, or resist them : then comes the argu- 
ment, to obey them will bring sin and sorrow ; to 
resist them is laborious or painful ; and thus, in 
one way or the other, the proposition is proved to 
be true. 

A Sorites (So-ri-tes) is a series of arguments so 
expressed, that we seem to ascend, as from step 
by step, to the conclusion. Suppose our propo- 
sition to be — All men of revenge are extreme fools : 
— we argue thus : All men of revenge have their 
souls often uneasy ; uneasy souls are a plague to 

* This is the plan of argument in Cicero's famous Oration 
in defence of Milo, who had killed Clodius. The three pro- 
positions which form the plan are these : It is lawful for one 
man to kill another who lies in wait for him. But Clodius lay 
in wait for Milo. Therefore it was lawful for Milo to kill Clo- 
dius. The first proposition the Orator proves from natural 
equity, from the custom of nations, from examples, &c. — the 
second he proves by the arms, guards, &c. which Clodius had 
provided. And these two being proved, the conclusion is 
irresistible. 



Direct and Indirect, Reductio ad absurdum. 67 

themselves ; noiv, to be one's own plague is folly in 
the extreme ; therefore, all men of revenge are ex- 
treme fools. — This indeed is the principle of all 
extensive argument, only it is not expressed with 
such formality. 

It is to be observed, lastly, that arguments are 
Categorical or Hypothetical. A categorical argu- 
ment is one whose ground is of necessity given, 
— A hypothetical argument is one whose ground 
is given only for the sake of seeing to what con- 
sequences it leads. An example of the latter 
may be found at page 47. A direct argument 
(using argument in its extensive sense) is one that 
at once infers the very proposition which was to be 
proved ; an indirect argument proves it by proving 
or refuting some other proposition : — direct argu- 
ments have been abundantly exemplified : — One 
kind of indirect argument is where we show the 
absurd consequences of admitting the proposition 
contrary to that we design to prove. This is 
called Reductio ad absurdum, i. e. reducing [the 
contrary] to an absurdity. An example has just 
been referred to, and a more extensive one may 
be found in Young's Night Thoughts, Night IX. 
commencing, 

" What am I, and from whence ?" &c. 

where the Being of a God is demonstrated by 
arguments of this kind. 



68 The several Kinds of Argument. 

There are some other ways of indirect argu- 
ment: — one consists in proving a proposition to 
be true which is less probable than the one we 
design to establish, and then arguing, a fortiori, 
that the latter must be true. But a more particu- 
lar account of these indirect ways of arguing ap- 
pears unnecessary. 



CHAPTER IV, 



ON THE METHOD OF WRITING THEMES, WITH EX- 
AMPLES ; AND PLANS FOR SEVERAL THEMES. 

In treating of Method in reasoning, it is common 
to divide it into two kinds, Analysis and Synthesis. 
All however that seems necessary to be said in 
this treatise concerning these distinctions, is, that 
in the mode of reasoning called Synthesis*, the 
proposition is the conclusion sought ; but in the 
reasoning called Analysis +, the conclusion cannot 
be previously proposed ; for till the arguments on 
which it depends are unfolded, it is presumed to 
be unknown. In reasoning synthetically, the ar- 
guer knows beforehand what is to be established ; 
and he may, at his option, propose it first, and add 
his arguments afterwards, or he may neglect to 
state the intended proposition, till he has brought 
forward what he has to advance in support of it. 

* A Greek word :— the meaning is, a putting [of argu- 
ments] together. 
f An unfolding or disentangling [of arguments.] 



70 Method of writing Themes. 

In reasoning analytically, the arguer lays down no- 
thing to be proved, nor has he any foreknown con- 
clusion in view, but he goes on, unfolding one 
argument after another, till he reaches a con- 
clusion. Analysis, therefore, is the way by which 
we attain truth ; Synthesis, that by which we com- 
municate it. We pursue the method of Analysis, 
when, not having formed our judgment on a sub- 
ject, we think to ourselves in order to form one : — 
we pursue the method of Synthesis when our 
judgment is formed, and we undertake to convince 
others. It is scarcely necessary to add that in 
writing themes, the principle on which we proceed 
is Synthesis # . 

Before any thing more particular is advanced 
on the method of writing themes, it must be men- 
tioned, that the manner in which a theme is given 
out, determines what latitude is allowed to the 
writer in treating it. When a theme is given out 
thus — On Education — On a Knowledge of the 
World — the theme may be called unlimited ; for 
the writer is left to lay down any propositions to 
be proved which he may think fit, provided they 
bear a due relation to the subject. But a parti- 
cular proposition being laid down to be proved, 
necessarily limits the theme ; as for instance when 

* The analytic method is often adopted for the sake of 
variety, and of seeming to be guided by, rather than to guide, 
the eurrent of thought ; but the principle, in reality, is 
always Synthetic. 



Method of writing Themes. 71 

a theme is given out thus — Man is the Creature of 
education. A proper knowledge of the World is 
favourable to virtue. This kind of theme is called 
a Thesis; — a Greek word signifying position or 
proposition ; — in the plural, Theses. An unlimited 
theme generally contains many theses ; for when- 
ever the writer goes into a new branch of his sub- 
ject, he must lay down, or have in view, some new 
proposition, that is a new thesis. In a limited 
theme, there is but one main proposition, to which 
every other ought to be subservient. This main 
proposition is called, by distinction, the thesis, and 
the theme which is written in support of it, takes 
the same name*. Premising thus much, we may 
now proceed to the purposed business of this 
chapter. 

We have seen that when a proposition and its 
argument are to be exhibited in connexion, their 
arrangement and manner of expression are by no 

* In Walker's very useful book, The Teacher's Assistayit in 
English Composition, what is here called a Thesis, is called, 
peculiarly, a Theme; and what are here called unlimited 
Themes, come under the denomination of Regular Subjects, 
if cast into a particular shape which that Author conceives 
to be proper for beginners, and Essays, if treated more freely. 
But the Author of the present manual, believes he is better 
warranted in using Theme as a general name for all exercises 
in composition, and Thesis for that peculiar kind of theme 
whose subject is a proposition. — It should be observed that 
theme and thesis are words of the same derivation. 



72 Method of writing Themes, 

means determinate, but that they may be varied 
in a great number of ways : for instance : 

Man is a creature endowed with reason and liberty ; 
therefore he is accountable for his actions. 

Man is accountable for his actions ; for he is endowed 
with reason and liberty. 

Surely a being must be accountable for his actions, 
to whom his Creator has given reason and liberty. 

How plain does it appear, that a creature endowed as 
man is with reason and liberty, must be accountable for 
his actions ! 

Can we believe that man, endowed as he is with 
reason and liberty, shall not be accountable for his 
actions ? 

Remember, O man, that thy Creator, by endowing 
thee with reason and liberty, has made thee accountable 
for thy actions. 

From this example it appears, that a proposi- 
tion and argument, of however little extent, are 
susceptible of a great variety of arrangement and 
expression, and hence it will be understood that 
the different ways in which the arguments of a 
theme may be stated and disposed, are almost 
endless. An experienced writer has only to con- 
sider his subject and form his conclusions, in or- 
der to determine in what manner he shall bring 
forward his propositions and arguments ; but a 
learner will scarcely be able even to set about con- 



Method of writing Themes. 73 

sidering what he has to say, till some plan of treat- 
ment is laid down. Hence it has been common 
with those who teach young persons Composition, 
to give them one general form as a pattern, and to 
require that they should adhere to it in every ex- 
ercise. But besides that this formality does not 
agree with the practice of good writers, it is very 
difficult to be always pursued ; since it requires 
some ingenuity, even in an experienced writer, to 
mould all subjects into one shape. It will be 
much better, therefore, that the teacher should 
frequently vary the plan he lays down for the 
pupil to follow, and this he will easily do, by al- 
ways talking over the subject with him, before he 
sends him to write it out as a theme. For the 
conversation can scarcely fail to suggest some pecu- 
liar method of treatment, and though it may not 
be the best that could be planned, it will answer 
the purpose of an exercise much better than con- 
stantly writing upon one model, since, by fre- 
quently changing his method, the pupil will most 
readily attain that variety and ease, which are 
among the main essentials of elegant composition. 
However, that nothing may be omitted which has 
been deemed serviceable, those forms for writing 
themes which are usually prescribed to young per- 
sons, shall be pointed out and exemplified, before 
any of a different kind are suggested. 

Suppose the theme given out to be Friendship : 
— teachers recommend the pupil to consider it 

E 



74 Method of writing Themes. 

under the following heads ; the Definition ; the 
Cause ; the state in Ancient, and in Modern 
times ; the Advantages ; the Disadvantages. 
Proper answers to the following questions will 
form such a theme as is here required : 

1 . What is Friendship ? 

2. What is the cause of Friendship ? 

8. What was anciently thought of Friendship, and 
what examples are on record ? 

4. What is Friendship often found to be in these days ? 

5. What are the benefits of true Friendship ? 

6. What are the evils of false Friendship? 

If these questions were fully discussed and an- 
swered, it is plain there would be as many themes 
as there are questions ; but learners are not re- 
quired to consider their subjects so much at large, 
and the following specimen would perhaps be ac- 
cepted as including as much as is necessary to be 
said. 

on friendship. 

1 . Friendship is an attachment arising from conge- 
niality of disposition, habits, and pursuits, strengthened 
by mutual good offices, and confirmed by time and tried 
fidelity. 

2. Man, individually, is a feeble ci'eature, and a sense 
of this weakness renders Friendship indispensable to him. 
In difficulty and distress, he looks around for advice, 
assistance, and consolation ; and even when fortune is 
propitious, and he has all other enjoyments within his 
reach, he still finds his happiness incomplete, unless 



Method of writing Themes. 75 

participated by one whom he considers his friend. 
3. No wonder, therefore, that a sentiment of such im- 
portance to man, should have been so often and so 
largely considered. We cannot open any of the volumes 
of antiquity, sacred or profane, without being reminded 
how excellent a thing is Friendship. The attachment 
of David and Jonathan, as recorded in Scripture ; of 
Achilles and Patroclus, celebrated by Homer ; and 
oCNisus and Euryalus, depicted by Virgil, are trite 
examples ; but they show the enthusiasm of ancient 
Friendship, and make us desirous of finding, in modern 
times, examples equally splendid. 4. Alas ! the senti- 
ment is, in these days, much more frequently nominal 
than real ; though it would no doubt be possible to 
produce, from every rank of society, specimens of ge- 
nerous and disinterested Friendship, creditable to hu- 
man nature, and the age in which we live. 

5. After these remarks, to enlarge on the benefits of 
possessing a real friend, appears unnecessary. What 
would be more intolerable, than the consciousness that, 
in all the wide world, not one heart beat in unison with 
our own, or cared for our welfare ? And if the idea of 
being unbefriended would make us miserable, the cer- 
tainty of possessing a real friend, must surely be an in- 
describable happiness, — a friend whom we know will 
counsel, instruct, assist, will bear a willing part in our 
calamity, and cordially rejoice when the hour of happi- 
ness returns. 6. Let us remember, however, that all who 
assume the name of friend, are not entitled to our con- 
fidence. False friends are but too common, whose 
motives are entirely selfish ; who are happy to find a 

E 2 



76 Method of writing Themes. 

heart they can pervert, a head they can mislead, if thus 
their unworthy ends can more surely be attained. 

In this example, (and the same must happen in 
other examples,) it will be remarked that the ar- 
guments belonging to one point, are not always 
quite distinct from those of another : — in the de- 
finition are some considerations that belong to the 
cause, and in exploring the cause, the mention of 
some of the benefits is anticipated. 

When, instead of an unlimited title, a thesis is 
given out to be proved, teachers recommend the 
following heads as helps to find the arguments : — 
the Proposition; the Reason; the Confirma- 
tion ; the Simile ; the Testimony ; the Exam- 
ple ; the Conclusion. Under the first head, the 
writer re-states his thesis in such a shape, that the 
arguments he designs to use will easily connect 
with it. Under the second, he brings forth the 
strongest, direct, internal argument he can find in 
proof of it, — that is, from the nature of the thing, 
from enumeration, from the cause, the effect, the 
adjuncts, the antecedents, or the consequents. 
Under the third, he tries to strengthen his proof 
by showing the absurdity of the contrary propo- 
sition, or by advancing some fresh argument of 
whatever kind, that is not taken from the same 
source as the preceding, and does not anticipate 
those that are to follow. Under the fourth, he 
uses an argument from Similitude. These are 



Method of writing Themes. 77 

internal arguments. Under the next two heads, 
he brings forward testimonies or authorities from 
authors of repute, and singular examples from 
history ; and lastly, he forms his conclusion not 
merely in the words of the proposition with which 
he set out (though in strictness the conclusion 
would be nothing more) but with some practical 
inference or inferences appended to it. The fol- 
lowing is an example of a Thesis upon this plan. 

THESIS. Trust not appearances. 

1. Proposition. 2. Reason. 3. Confirmation. 
4. Simile. 5. Quotation. 6. Example. 7. 
Conclusion. 

1. It is highly imprudent to be guided in our opi- 
nions and conduct by first appearances. 2. For the 
worst of persons and of things wear at times the most 
engaging aspect : the wily thief approaches in the garb 
of scrupulous honesty ; the corrupter of hearts carries 
on his brow nothing but benevolence and candour : 
vices of every kind assume the guise of virtues ; and 
pleasures that end in misery promise, at first, nothing 
but delight. In things of less importance, deception 
and fraud are equally common. The unjust trader 
gives a false appearance to his wares ; and mere empi- 
rics in art or science, make larger promises than they 
who are really skilful. 

3. Is this description of what we meet with in the 
world exaggerated or false ? If the arts of deception 
are of rare occurrence, why are parents so careful to 

e3 



78 Method of writing Themes. 

impress on their inexperienced children the necessity of 
caution ? — why do we consider the heedless, the giddy, 
the easily confiding, to be always in danger ? — why do 
we alter our judgments of things as we grow in years ; 
and why do we often become more suspicious, when, 
from having acquired greater experience in the ways of 
the world, we must be less exposed to have our minds 
deceived? 4. The truth is, we are surrounded with 
specious appearances, nor is it till after a time that we 
discover our liability to deception, and that what w r e 
take for substantial good may probably be nothing but 
glittering tinsel. 5. " The world," says Shakspeare, 
11 is still deceived with ornament : it is 

the guiled shore 

To a most dangerous sea, the beauteous scarf 
Veiling an Indian beauty ; in a word, 
The seeming truth which cunning times put on 
To entrap the wisest." 

6. When the Greeks, after a ten years' siege, found 
themselves unable to take Troy by force, they feigned 
an abandonment, and left behind them a large wooden 
horse filled with armed men. This being dragged into 
the city by the credulous Trojans, the men left their 
concealment in the night, opened the gates, and gave 
admission to the besiegers. Thus fell Troy ; and thus 
are all persons liable to be lured to their destruction, 
who will not mistrust appearances when there is danger 
of being deceived. (7.) Therefore, let us not be too 
secure or confiding,— but when new doctrines are of- 
fered to our notice ; or new inventions that throw the 
old into the shade ; or new acquaintances whose man- 



Method of writing Themes* 79 

ners are more engaging than tried friends, — let us sus- 
pend our judgment, and not be carried away by first 
impressions : let us wait till time and experience furnish 
some sure grounds for the opinion we are inclined to 
form, and the conduct we are disposed to pursue. 

In reviewing this example, it will appear that 
the several parts of the theme are not completely 
distinct from each other, nor indeed, without the 
greatest stiffness and formality can they ever be so. 
The argument from similitude is not peculiar to 
the portion of the theme assigned to it, but occurs 
wherever a figurative expression is used* The 
conclusion is implied in all the arguments that are 
used to enforce it, and might be omitted without 
any prejudice to the reasoning, the proposition 
being in fact the conclusion sought to be esta- 
blished. Neither is it by any means necessary 
that all the parts of the theme should occur in 
the order here laid down, but the proposition, the 
reason, the confirmation, the simile, the quotation, 
the example, supposing them all to occur, may 
come in whatever place the current of the writer's 
thoughts happens to bring them. Instead of di- 
viding a theme into the parts here exhibited, some 
teachers divide it into three — 1. Definition: 
2. Arguments : S. Judgment or Conclusion. 
Certain it is, that a writer ought to understand the 
nature of the subject concerning which the pro- 
position is made, before he attempts the other 
parts of his theme ; he ought to have framed the 
e4 



80 Method of writing Themes. 

proposition clearly in his mind ; and he should be 
able to support it by suitable proofs. But though 
these are indispensable pre-requisites toward writ- 
ing a theme, it does not follow that distinct and 
separate parts corresponding with them must be 
found in every well-written essay. Who, for in- 
stance, having a moral essay to write on Industry 
or on Time, would go out of his way to frame what 
is not at all wanted, — a logical or philosophical 
definition of Industry or of Time, or furnish any 
explanation of the thing in the nature of such a 
definition? Accordingly it will be found, that 
what those teachers call a definition in such cases, 
is nothing but an oratorical definition, which is so 
far from being distinct from the part of the theme 
called the Argument, that it is, in fact, the prin- 
cipal argument employed. With all submission, 
therefore, to his predecessors, the author of this 
manual cannot help thinking, that the parts into 
which they divide a theme, are very frequently 
** distinctions without a difference." When a 
truth is proved by argument, he believes that the 
truth or proposition, and the argument are the 
only things essentially different. As to an ex- 
planatory definition, it may or may not be neces- 
sary, in order to make known the meaning of a 
word which is to be used in the proposition ; but, 
every such definition becomes a part of the pro- 
position ; for it is stated in order to be included 
in it. Even the distinction between the proposi- 



Method of writing Themes* 81 

tion and the arguments holds good only while the 
proposition is in the course of proof; for if it is 
established in order to be made use of toward 
inferring some further truth, it is then, — consi- 
dered in this relation, — likewise an argument, and 
the truth inferred from it, is the proposition or 
conclusion sought, and thus on till the writer at- 
tains the final conclusion he intends to establish. 
Yet even this final conclusion is, possibly, never 
stated formally, but is merely inferred without 
being expressed. So much for the distinctions 
laid down by teachers of Composition, which we 
shall often attempt to discover in vain in the best 
essays of our best writers. Are we then to pre- 
scribe no method to the young theme-writer, but 
leave him to set down his thoughts on every sub- 
ject at random? Nothing can be further from 
the author's meaning : there must be method in 
every theme, or it does not deserve to be called 
one ; but it should be a method that grows out of 
the writer's view of the subject, not founded on 
distinctions which may be merely nominal, and 
give the stiffness of a division without its uses. 
If a peculiar method for each theme proposed, 
should be too much to require of the pupil at 
first, it must be for the teacher to suggest what- 
ever plan may occur to him as not unsuitable, 
after a conversation upon the subject. By way of 
specimen, it shall be the business of the remainder 
of this chapter to lay down plans for several 

e 5 



S2 Plans for Themes. 

themes, being such as have occurred to the au- 
thor in giving out the respective subjects to his 
pupils. They do not, by any means, pretend to 
exclusive propriety, but are left to be followed if 
none other occur more agreeable to the teacher or 
the learner's views. 

On Composition. As this word is variously 
applied, you must begin by a definition : — 1. State 
the general meaning of the word, its application 
to particular arts, and the art to which you limit 
the meaning. 2. Show the necessity of studying 
the art, by proving that knowledge is of little use, 
without skill to communicate it : 3. that no one is 
skilful in the art, but through observation and 
practice. (The figures refer to the divisions or 
paragraphs which are to appear in the theme.) 

To exemplify the use which is to be made of 
these hints, this first theme shall be subjoined as a 
pupil might write it at full. 

ON COMPOSITION. 

Composition, as a general term, signifies arrange- 
ment. Hence we hear of Composition in music, in 
painting, in printing, and in other arts. I use it at 
present to signify the art of arranging our thoughts, 
and expressing them in a connected manner. 

All who are destined to receive a liberal education, 
should deem this art of essential importance. Their 
other accomplishments will avail little, if they want 
ability in this. It is by their discourse that the world 



Plans for Themes. 83 

will judge of their acquirements ; and will certainly 
not give them much credit for what they know, if their 
manner of thinking appear immethodical, and their 
language confused and inelegant. On the other hand, 
when a person exhibits his thoughts, in writing or con- 
versation, with clearness and grace, the world is apt to 
give him more credit for his knowledge than perhaps he 
can justly claim. 

To acquire this important art, we must employ the 
means by which all arts are learned, — observation and 
practice. Let us not imagine it was ever obtained on 
other terms. The readiest in the art were at some pains 
to gain their skill, and the dullest, if they can recollect a 
time when they thought and spoke with less method and 
precision, may improve still further, if they will give up 
their minds to the necessary study and exercise. 

On Conversation. 1. Begin by remarking, 
that the ability to hold converse with each other 
is little appreciated, because in so familiar use, 
that its value escapes notice. Go on to state that 
it will therefore be interesting and useful to consi- 
der the Improvement and the Pleasure we derive 
from it. 2. Explain the Improvement we ought 
to derive from it. 3. Show that we are indebted 
to it for the chief Pleasures of Life. 

On Reading. 1. Explain in what way Read- 
ing may be deemed a kind of conversation. 2. 
Show that, in general, it is of a higher character 
than ordinary conversation, because the persons 
with whom we choose so to hold converse, will 
be those who have been most eminent for their 
e 6 



84 Plans for Themes. 

knowledge, and the language employed is more 
exact and polished. 3. It seldom has the same 
lively effect on the mind, because the tones of the 
voice are wanting, and because we cannot inter- 
rupt the discourse by pertinent queries. 4. Show 
that, by being properly conducted, under the di- 
rection, and with the assistance, of an intelligent 
friend or teacher, it becomes much more effective 
than without such aid. 

On Writing. 1. Trace the probable progress 
of the art, from pictures to artificial symbols of 
things, from these to marks standing for whole 
words, and lastly to marks standing for the ele- 
mentary sounds out of which words are framed. 
Show the advantages of this last mode. 2. Relate, 
if you can, some story, to prove how a man entirely 
ignorant of the art, must be surprised at its effects. 
3. State the reasons which should make us highly 
prize it. 

On Printing. 1. State how long this inven- 
tion has been in existence among Europeans. 2. 
What was the condition of the mass of mankind 
previously to its invention. 3. What have been 
its effects. 

On History. 1. Define history, and show at 
the same time what is meant by biography. 2. 
Propose to enumerate the chief inducements or 
recommendations to the study of history, compre- 
hending biography in your notion of it. 3. First, 
we must study history, in order not to be ignorant 



Plans for Themes. 85 

of things, which all well educated people know. 
4. Secondly, we should study history for the sake 
of the better knowledge it gives us of our species, 
and the characters of men. 5. Thirdly, because 
it is a system of practical morality, teaching us, by 
example, what to avoid, and what to follow. 6. 
Lastly, because it is calculated to interest the 
mind and improve the heart. 

On Study. 1. We cannot become wiser or 
better informed than others, but by the earnest 
application of the mind. Go on to illustrate this 
truth by comparison — we must dig deep — science 
lies not on the surface ready to be picked up. It 
cannot be transmitted — compare it in this respect 
to wealth, rank, &c. 2. Study is the exercise of 
the mind, as labour is of the body. Pursue the ana- 
logy, and show the effects to be similar in the two 
cases. 3. Books do not furnish the only means of 
study. 

On Happiness. 1. It is the great object of all 
our actions. Men pursue it in different ways ac- 
cording to their different characters — illustrate thi s 
truth. 2. Show that happiness does not depend 
on things external, provided we have all that our 
bodily wants require, but on the temper of the 
mind — that wealth and power are not necessarily 
favourable to the state of mind in which happiness 
consists ; that guilt is altogether destructive of it. 
3. As a conclusion, show in what condition and 
under what circumstances, we are likeliest to en- 



86 Plans for Themes. 

joy as much happiness as human beings are capa- 
ble of. 

On Piety. 1. It is the source of virtue, and 
of all happiness. First, it is the source of virtue. 
A man may do good actions from other motives, — 
from fear, from ostentation, from habit, from the 
absence of evil opportunities : show that these mo- 
tives will not always operate the same effect, but 
that a man, while influenced by piety, must be 
virtuous. 2. Secondly, it is the source of happi- 
ness ; for happiness depends on the temper of the 
mind, and whatever may be a man's outward cir- 
cumstances, no one can deprive him of that peace 
which is the result, &c. 

On Hope. 1. It is the most benignant of the 
passions; the charm of our existence; the star that 
guides the traveller as he journeys on a rugged 
way, &c. 2. On the other hand it must be con- 
fessed that hope is often delusive. Every day adds 
to our disappointments. In youth, we see nothing 
but joys in the path before us ; but, &c. 3. It is 
not difficult to conceive why we are doomed to 
these disappointments. We are destined for an- 
other world, and must be taught to carry our 
hopes beyond this transitory scene. 

On Memory. 1. It is the storehouse of the 
mind, designed to preserve all that time and ob- 
servation acquaint us with. The judgment and 
understanding get stronger as we grow older, but 
memory is generally in full perfection when we 



Plans for Themes. 87 

are young. Show the final cause or purpose of 
this. 2. It should be cultivated in connexion with 
the understanding, otherwise we learn like parrots. 
State the consequences of such a mode of study. 
3. Enumerate some of the pleasures of memory. 

On Good Temper. 1. It is one of the greatest 
blessings we can enjoy; — a talisman which makes 
every thing agreeable ; — a shield that preserves its 
possessor from the attacks, &c. ; or it is like the 
rays of the sun in spring, which give, even to the 
most gloomy objects, &c; while a bad temper, on 
the other hand, is like, &c. 2. Show how far it 
depends upon ourselves to correct a bad temper, 
or preserve a good one. 

On Curiosity. 1. It is highly useful and 
praiseworthy when well directed : it is very per- 
nicious when directed amiss. 2. State the effects 
of well-directed curiosity; 3. of ill-directed cu- 
riosity. 

On Envy and Emulation. 1. The root of 
these passions is the same, namely, a desire of su- 
periority, but the soil in which it grows is dif- 
ferent. If the desire of excellence springs up in a 
mind endowed, &c; but if, on the contrary, it 
takes possession of, &c. 2. State the symptoms by 
which a person may know w r hether he is actuated 
by envy or by emulation in his conduct towards a 
competitor. 

On Patriotism. 1. It is a sentiment incul- 



88 Plans for Themes. 

cated by nature. We love our kindred with the 
strongest affection; next in degree those with 
whom we are intimate ; next, &c. 2. As nature 
has an end in all her gifts, inquire into the bene- 
fits of patriotism. 

On Liberty. 1. A subject calculated to 
awaken emotions of admiration in favour of those 
who have struggled for it. We think of the he- 
roes of Greece, and Rome, of Switzerland, and of 
Britain, and pronounce with reverence the names 
of, &c. 2. Our admiration and love of liberty are 
justified by the evils which attend a state of slavery. 
3. But liberty must not be confounded with licen- 
tiousness. In the freest states, there always is, 
and always must be, a due subordination of ranks. 

On Filial Duty. 1. The earliest virtue we 
can practise ; the earnest of future excellence :— 
the child who is dutiful to his parents, gives the 
best pledge that in after life, &c. 2. It is the 
sign of a good understanding as well as of a good 
heart. 3. It is esteemed an indispensable virtue 
in all pagan nations, and the religion of our own 
country makes it a command of God. 

On Self-knowledge. 1. No kind of know- 
ledge is less cultivated, yet none so important. 
Prove that it is little cultivated, by describing 
how readily people of different characters exclaim 
against the vices in others which are conspicuous 
in themselves. 2. Argue its importance by show- 



Plans for Themes. 89 

ing the amendment of character and conduct 
which would be the result of even a moderate ad- 
vance in it. 

On Obedience. 1. Our progress in virtue, in 
knowledge, and in happiness, depends upon obe- 
dience. First, our progress in virtue depends 
upon it, from the nature of virtue which consists, 
&c. 2. Secondly, our progress in knowledge de- 
pends upon it, because we learn from the instruc- 
tion of others; whose guidance, if w T e are not 
ready to follow, &c. 3. Thirdly, our progress in 
happiness depends upon it, because, by it, we shall 
be preserved from those ills which are the fruits of 
disobedience, namely, from, &c. 

On Enthusiasm. 1. Ardour of mind engen- 
dered by something that affects the imagination. 
It is a fault when it arises from spiritual pride, and 
leads a person, in religious affairs, to extravagant 
notions of divine interference. 2. But when joined 
with judgment and modesty, it is an admirable 
quality, and leads to the noblest results — in the 
active virtues, in the pursuit of science, in the cul- 
tivation of the fine arts. 

On Adversity. 1. No one desires adversity; 
yet to creatures whose present existence is destined 
for a state of trial, it is often a real good. First, it 
softens the heart, and makes it sensible of the woes 
of others. He who never felt pain, cannot sym- 
pathize with those who feel it : it is the same with 
regard to all afflictions of whatever kind. 2. Se- 



90 Plans for Themes. 

condly, it purifies as well as softens the heart. 
Prosperity makes us forgetful of ourselves and 
our duties. Our appetites and passions grow cla- 
morous through indulgence. The best and wisest 
men have been tempted by prosperity — David — 
Solomon. 3. Thirdly, it makes us capable of en- 
joying good fortune. He who has felt the misery 
of cold, hunger, damp, and weariness, knows the 
value of a good fire, &c. So it is with all change 
of fortune after we have been in affliction. 

On Habit. 1. It is a principle of so much 
power, as to be called, with justice, a second na- 
ture. Show its power by remarking the amazing 
facility we acquire in the practice of various arts, 
compared with our first attempts. 2. There is 
every reason to suppose that our minds are as 
liable to the control of habit, as our bodies. 3. 
Draw suitable inferences for the regulation of our 
moral conduct. 

On Order. 1. It is of the utmost importance 
in all the concerns of life. The Creator who made 
Order to spring out of Chaos, ordained it to be 
absolutely necessary to the well-being, and the 
right conduct of man. The blessings of good go- 
vernment are the blessings of Order. The same 
principle operating on a smaller scale, is the source 
of comfort and happiness in every household. 2. 
Order necessary in our studies ; — the consequences 
of want of method in the pursuit of knowledge, and 
of loose, desultory reading. 3. A love of order 



Subjects for Themes. 91 

almost the same with a love of virtue ; for while 
we love order, we cannot love what is intemperate 
or unrestrained in mind, manners, passion, or con- 
duct. 

On the Regulation of the Thoughts. 1. If 
we wish to be wise, if we wish to be good, if we 
wish to be happy, we must regulate our thoughts. 
First, if we wish to be wise : — for the powers of 
the mind act as we suffer them to act. If we al- 
low them to dwell on trifles, w r e shall miss the so- 
lid treasures of the understanding, and remain 
without improvement. 2. Secondly, if we wish 
to be good: — for evil thoughts always precede 
evil actions. To repress the former is therefore a 
sure way to prevent the latter. 3. Thirdly, if we 
wish to be happy :— for what prevents any one from 
being happy whose bodily wants are supplied, but 
the uneasiness of his awn thoughts ? Describe dif- 
ferent characters who suffer their thoughts to de- 
stroy their peace — the over-careful person, the 
envious person, the covetous person, &c. 

The author hopes that these outlines for treat- 
ing the several subjects, will be sufficient to intro- 
duce the young learner to the business of theme- 
writing. He will now give a few more titles, with- 
out suggesting any plan of treatment. 

On Taste. On Fashion. On Poetry. On Music. 
On Painting. On Sculpture. On Architecture. 
On the Drama. On Astronomy. On Geography. 



92 Plans for Themes. 

On Agriculture. On Food, Shelter, and Clothing. 
On Industry. On Time. On Health. On Sleep. 
On Procrastination. On Amusements. On Soli- 
tude. On the Golden Mean. On Egotism. On 
Affectation. On Vanity. On Vulgarity. On Ad- 
vice. On Justice. On Prudence. On Temperance. 
On Fortitude. On Anger. On Pride. On Cha- 
rity. On Flattery. On Friendship. On Preju- 
dice. On Ambition. On Courage. On Spring. 
On Summer. On Autumn. On Winter. On Wealth. 
On Poverty. On Peace. On War. On Morals. 
On Manners. On Religion. On Superstition. 
On Death. 

In all these, the theme or subject proposed is 
unlimited, and the writer is left to lay down what- 
ever particular propositions or theses he may 
choose, provided they have a due relation to the 
general subject. Instead of an unlimited theme, 
the teacher will sometimes give out a thesis : ex- 
amples will scarcely be necessary, because in the 
plans already suggested, each division of the theme, 
is intended to be an illustration of some particular 
thesis. However, for the further guidance of the 
learner, the following examples are added. 

'tis education forms the common mind. 

1 . Begin by explaining the thesis in your own 

words. Admit that instances may be found of 

persons whose life and conduct do not seem to 

agree with the education they received. Point 



Plans for Themes. 93 

out that these exceptions are not sufficient in num- 
ber to invalidate the general rule. Argue that, 
according to a comprehensive view of education, 
they may not even be exceptions ; and then define 
education to include much more than the instruc- 
tion of professional teachers ; shew that whatever 
circumstances give a bias to the mind during youth, 
may properly be reckoned to take a share in form- 
ing the person's education. 2. As an additional 
argument, show that education is appointed by 
Providence as the means of correcting whatever is 
naturally bad in the human mind ; and it cannot 
be supposed that the means are not, at all times, 
adequate to the end, if employed to their full ex- 
tent, and adapted completely to the particular case. 

VIRTUE IS ITS OWN REWARD. 

Remark that human understanding must always 
be unable to trace the ways of Providence in his 
dispensations to men ; but of this we may be sure, 
that he cannot be unjust, though, in the folly of 
our hearts, we may sometimes be tempted to ques- 
tion the equity of his appointments in the portion 
of good and ill dealt out to the virtuous and the 
vicious in this life. Go on to show, by various 
examples, in what manner the latter often seem to 
have the advantage of the former in a worldly 
point of view. 2. Show that things are to be es- 
timated according to the happiness which they 



94 Plans for Themes. 

really confer ; and prove that the vicious cannot 
find happiness in the things which they have co- 
veted. 3. Describe the qualities of mind and 
heart which constitute virtue, and which must al- 
ways accompany it while virtue lasts, and prove 
that these are more than sufficient to weigh against 
all other advantages ; and therefore if all other 
advantages are wanting, (which however is seldom 
the case,) that virtue nevertheless has an abun- 
dant recompense. 

KNOWLEDGE IS POWER. 

1. Remark that this is a celebrated maxim of 
the great Lord Bacon. Prove it to be true by the 
dominion which man has acquired over the se- 
veral parts of nature. He is inferior in bodily 
strength and natural cunning, to many of the in- 
ferior animals. Exemplify this truth, and show 
how, by his knowledge, he nevertheless makes 
all animals subservient to his designs. 2. Show 
that even the most boisterous and unruly of the 
elements, the vast ocean, is, in a great measure, 
subdued to his purposes. He has learned to find 
his way across its trackless expanse, and to waft, 
through its means, the wealth of distant lands from 
shore to shore. 3. Exhibit instances in illustra- 
tion of the same truth from other departments of 
nature ; show that the daily discoveries which are 
making in the sciences continually add to our 



Plans for Themes. 95 

power ; and bring forward, in particular, the in- 
vention of the steam engine, and the purposes to 
which it is applied. 



It hardly needs be remarked that there are 
other forms in which themes may be set to exer- 
cise the thinking faculties of young people, beside 
those that have been exemplified. They may 
sometimes be required to form an opinion of what 
they read in history or in poetry, and give the 
reasons for their opinion. And sometimes it will 
not be amiss to propose questions in the following 
shape, leaving to their choice the one or other 
side of an alternative. 

Which, for a permanence, would you prefer, — a 
town or a country life? 

Which is the worse condition — health with pre- 
carious subsistence, or abundance with precarious 
health ? 

Which is more to be deplored — mental or cor- 
poreal blindness? 

Who was more deserving the title of Great — 
Alexander or Alfred? 

In treating such questions, the writer should set 
out by endeavouring to ascertain some general 
principles as a guide to his subsequent decision. 
In the first of these, for instance, he should in- 
quire, what are the chief comforts and advantages 
a reasonable man looks for in life? — in the second, 



96 Plans for Themes. 

how far that precarious subsistence is an evil, 
which permits a man to continue in health? — in 
the third, what is meant by mental blindness? — 
and in the fourth, what constitutes real greatness 
of character? These premises determined, the 
decision will be easy. 

The author, before he dismisses these chapters 
from his pen, thinks it not beside their purpose to 
remind the young student, that the object of logic, 
is, not to engender a fondness for disputation, a 
contradictious spirit, a love of paradox, and a 
readiness to contend against all settled opinions, 
but, on the contrary, that real improvement in the 
art can take place only in a mind imbued with 
modesty, humility, and candour. It is no proof of 
improved rational powers when a person is ready 
to argue at random against the opinions of others, 
merely for the sake of argument, or is forward to 
discredit what is held in repute by the good and 
the wise, because it is not immediately evident to 
his own understanding. That these remarks may 
make the deeper impression, the following Thesis 
is added as a concluding exercise, along with an 
outline for treating it. 

A LITTLE LEARNING IS A DANGEROUS THING; 
DRINK DEEP, OR TASTE NOT. 

1 . Begin by explaining what is meant by learn- 
ing in this thesis : show that it evidently does not 
mean Reading, Writing, Languages, Arithmetic, 



Plans for Themes. 97 

Geometry, and those other things we learn in 
youth to fit us for the duties of life ; for though 
it is highly desirable to know those things well, 
yet to know a little is undeniably better than to be 
wholly ignorant. What the writer must mean, is 
Speculative learning or Philosophy ; the business 
of which is to call in question whatever is com- 
monly learned on the warrant of custom or autho- 
rity, in order to establish it, if capable of being so 
established, on the surer basis of reason. 2. Hav- 
ing thus defined the notion of learning here con- 
templated, go on to show, that, during the course 
of such inquiries, our reason is apt to be misled 
by imperfect views ; that instead of being timid 
and cautious in the conclusions we draw, we are 
almost irresistibly led to be bold and presuming, 
because we think we must know better than others 
who have not ventured, like ourselves, into the 
fields of inquiry ; and hence we not only call in 
question, but we despise all principles, for which 
we cannot see any sufficient foundation ; forgetting 
that the cause may be, the yet imperfect state of 
our knowledge. As we advance, we get wider r 
views ; we see and are forced to acknowledge our 
early mistakes ; our former arrogance teaches us 
humility; and we examine, with more candour, 
the doctrines opposed to our own opinions. 3. The 
foregoing arguments, properly developed, will be 
sufficient to prove the truth of the thesis. But if 
the writer possess the requisite information, he 



98 Plans for Themes. 

may illustrate the arguments by proofs from his- 
tory: — he may show what mischiefs have arisen 
from adopting, for maxims of conduct, the sug- 
gestions of an imperfect philosophy, and how un- 
safe it is, in religion, in morals, in politics, to 
give a hasty reception to doctrines, which having 
arisen one day, may possibly be overwhelmed the 
next. 



♦ 



APPENDIX. 



I. QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINING THE PUPIL, ADAPTED 
TO THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS, 



£* The answer is occasionally added to the question, when it 
cannot be readily collected from the page referred to* 



CHAPTER I. 

What is the strict meaning of the word Theme ? 
page 1. 

What is that frequent meaning of the word, in which 
you will have to use it ? page 1 . 

What art is the writing of themes intended to im- 
prove? page 1. 

What is the first fault to be guarded against in writ- 
ing themes ? page 2. 

What is the second fault? page 3. 

What is the third? page 8. 

What is the fourth? page 12. 

What is the fifth ? page 13. 

What is the sixth ? page 14. 

What relation do the fourth, fifth, and sixth faults 
bear to the first? 

f2 



100 Appendix. Questions for Examination. 

Answer. They are particular instances of the first 
fault. 

What is the seventh fault? page 15. 

What is the eighth fault? page 16. 

Of what general fault are the seventh and eighth to 
be reckoned as particular instances ? page 15. 

What is the ninth fault ? page 19. 

What is the tenth ? page 20. 

What is the eleventh? page 21. 

What is the twelfth ? page 24. 

What is the thirteenth ? page 26. 

What is the fourteenth ? page 28. 

Why are these faults, namely, the ninth, tenth, ele- 
venth, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth, considered to 
be particular instances of the third general fault ? 

Answer. Because they all consist in some disagree- 
ment, or want of just connexion, among thoughts which 
are intended to explain, enforce, or illustrate each other. 

CHAPTER II. 

What chief thing is it that renders the writing of 
themes difficult to young persons ? page 29. 

When is it they may be deemed fit to enter on exer- 
cises of this kind ? page 29. 

In what manner do young persons make use of ge- 
neral terms in their early converse? pages 29 and 30. 

What two things are necessary toward the art of ge- 
neralizing ? pages 30, 31. 

How will the first of these two requisites be ob- 
tained? page 31. 

How will the second requisite, namely a skilful use 



Appendix, Questions for Examination, 101 

of language in expressing general notions and conclu- 
sions, be obtained? page 31. 

Give some examples of the difficulty which may be 
felt in expressing a general proposition ? pages 32, 33. 

How may the learner's improvement be forwarded 
in the apt and ready application of general terms ? 
page 33, 

What does the term being comprehend, in philoso- 
phical language ? page 33. 

In common language, how do we speak of substances? 
pages 33, 34. 

How are material beings classed ? page 34. 

What is the plural of genus ? page 34. 

What is the plural of species ? page 34. 

What are the genera of animals ? page 34. 

What does each genus comprehend ? page 34. 

What have you to remark concerning the general 
sense of the appellation Man ? page 34. 

How, in common language, do we speak of what is 
philosophically called mode ? page 34. 

Give some instances of expressions which are used 
in speaking of modes, page 35. 

What is meant by a moral universal ? pages 35,36. 

Are the general propositions which chiefly occur in 
reasoning, meant to be affirmed as strictly or com- 
pletely true ? page 36* 

Give some examples of general propositions, and 
explain the amount of their meaning, page 36. 

What is it which frequently and necessarily obstructs 
the ready admission of general truths into the mind of 
a young person ? pages 36, 31. 

f3 



102 Appendix. Questions for Examination. 

CHAPTER III. 

What is an argument? page 38. 

What do you call any conclusion which you form in 
your mind, before you express it in words ? page 38. 

What do you call it when expressed in words ? page 
38. 

What is the ultimate ground of all argument ? page 
39. 

When we communicate facts, are we said to argue ? 
page 39. 

Of what description is the following, and other pro- 
positions of the same kind : " It is impossible for the 
same thing to be and not to be ?" 

Answer. It is a truth which we know on the first oc- 
casion for knowing it, which, in this instance, is as soon 
as we know our own existence. But the expression of this 
truth in general terms, is a contrivance of learning, and 
is familiar only to those who have been taught*. 

Of what description is the following, and every pro- 
position of the same kind : " Man is a creature en- 
dowed with reason and liberty ?" 

Answer. It is a general truth comprehending a num- 
ber of particular truths, and resting on the evidence they 
furnish. 

Give obvious instances of propositions that rest on 
their own basis, because they narrate facts, page 40. 

Explain why the following propositions may also be 

* Nothing is taught beyond the words: the truth itself 
cannot be made clearer than it always was ; and the un- 
learned are apt to think the proposition idle. 



Appendix. Questions for Examination. 103 

said to rest on their own basis : " A circle is such a 
figure, that all lines drawn from a certain point within 
it to the circumference, are equal to one another." 
" Maliciously killing a man is murder." page 41. 

How do known truths become the means of inferring 
new or unknown truths ? pages 41, 42. 

What is a truth called, when, by its assistance, some 
proposition is an argument for inferring a new or un- 
known truth ? page 42. 

What is the plural of datum ? page 42. 

Enumerate such truths as generally form the data on 
which arguments are raised, page 42. 

Why are the data of arguments more frequently un- 
derstood than expressed ? page 43. 

What is the meaning of physically true? page 43. 

What is the meaning of metaphysically true ? page 
43. 

What is the meaning of mathematically true ? page 
44. 

What is the meaning of morally true ? page 44. 

To what kind of certainty does the term demonstra- 
tive apply ? page 44. 

What is meant by arguing a priori ? page 45. See 
also page 59. 

What is meant by arguing a posteriori? page 45. 
See also page 59. 

Why can there be no demonstrative certainty in ar- 
guing a posteriori ? page 45. 

How may any of the examples you have had occa- 
sion to use, be exhibited in the form of a syllogism ? 
pages 45, 46, 47. 

F 4 



104 Appendix. Questions for Examination. 

In theoretical logic, what are the three parts of a 
syllogism called ? page 46. 

When speaking of the first two propositions, what do 
you call them ? page 46. 

What is a syllogism called, when stripped of one of 
its premises ? page 47. 

State such considerations and such examples, as may 
prove that the enthymeme needs not be, and is not, 
always expressed in its regular form, pages 47, 48. 

Whence is it that people are bold in attempting to 
argue, who really know nothing of the business of ar- 
guing ? page 49. 

In what respects ought you, who, in the foregoing 
considerations, have studied the nature of an argument, 
to be better informed ? page 50. 

What is the origin of the word invention ? page 5 1 . 

When are we said to reason from the definition of 
the thing ? page 52. 

When does the argument from Etymology take place ? 
page 53. 

What do you mean by argument in a more compre- 
hensive sense than you generally employ it in these ex- 
planations ? page 54. 

When do we reason from Enumeration ? page 54. 

What does Induction signify ? page 54. See also 
page 40. 

When does the argument from Species take place ? 
page 55. 

How do we proceed in reasoning from the Genus ? 
page 56. 



Appendix. Questions for Examination. 105 

Why does there seem, at first, but little use in this 
kind of argument ? page 56. 

What are some of its uses ? pages 56, 57. 

When do we reason from the Adjuncts, Antecedents, 
Consequents, Cause, or Effect? pages, 57, 58. 

Exemplify each of these, pages 58, 59. 

Explain what is meant by the efficient, and what by 
the final Cause, page 59. 

When do we reason from Similitude, Comparison, or 
Contraries? page 59. 

Exemplify the first of these, pages 59, 60. 

Is figurative language employed in speech solely for 
the sake of ornament ? page 60. 

When are we properly said to reason from Compari- 
son? page 60. 

In reasoning from Comparison, when are we said to 
argue a fortiori ? pages 60, 61. 

In reasoning from Comparison, when are we said to 
argue from a parallel truth, the parity of the case, or 
Analogy? pages 60, 61. 

When may we draw a general proportionate infer- 
ence in reasoning from Comparison? pages 60, 61. 

How do we reason from Contraries ? page 61. 

Why are the topics of argument which you have thus 
far described, called internal ? page 62. 

What are external topics ? page 62. 

Why are these said to be borrowed from without I 
page 62. 

Thus far, you have distinguished arguments by dif- 
ferent names according to the different topics or places 
whence they are taken. W T hat is the next cause of dis- 
tinction among them ? pages 62, 63. 

F 5 



106 Appendix. Questions for Examination. 

What is meant by argumentum ad judicium ? page 63. 

Explain the nature of argument to the learned or 
initiated ? page 63. 

What is meant by argumentum ad hominem ? page 63. 

What is meant by argumentum ad verecundiam ? page 
64. 

What is meant by argumentum ad ignorantiam ? page 
64. 

What is meant by argumentum ad passiones ? page 
64. 

What is the next cause you have to mention for dis- 
tinguishing arguments by different names ? pages 64, 
65. 

What is a syllogism ? page 65. See also pages 46, 
47. 

What is an Enthymeme? page 65. See also page 47* 

What is an Epichirema ? pages 65, 66. 

What is a Dilemma ? page 66. 

What is a Sorites ? pages 66, 67. 

What is a categorical argument? page 67. 

What is a hypothetical argument? page 67. 

What is meant by direct argument ? page 67. 

What is meant by indirect argument ? page 67. 

What is meant by reductio ad absurdum ? page 67. 

CHAPTER IV. 

What is the derivative meaning of the words, Ana- 
lysis and Synthesis? page 69, and note. 

In what chief respects do these two principles differ ? 
page 69, 70. 

When may a theme be called unlimited ? page 70. 



Appendix, Rules for Punctuation, 107 

What is a thesis ? page 71. 

Give me an example to prove the variety of forms 
in which a proposition and its argument may be ex- 
pressed, pages 71, 72. 

Can you state certain heads, beginning with the De- 
finition, the Cause, &c, under which some teachers re- 
commend pupils to consider unlimited subjects ? pages 
73, 74. 

Can you state the heads under which they recom- 
mend a thesis to be considered, beginning with the Pro- 
position, the Reason, &c. ? pages 76, 77. 

Describe what is to be done under each of these, 
pages 76, 77. 

What objection may be made to these plans ? 

Answer. That the heads so distinguished are very 
often " distinctions without a difference." 

Can any plan be substituted in place of these ? 

Answer. No one single plan. Every theme ought, 
horvever, to have a plan, which should arise out of a care- 
ful meditation on t!*3 subject, assisted, if possible, by some 
converse upon it with a friend or the teacher. 



II. A FEW GENERAL RULES FOR PUNCTUATION. 

The marks used in writing — some, to render clear 
the grammatical construction, some, the general intent, 
of sentences — are the full stop, (.) the colon, (:) the 
semicolon, (;) the comma, (,) the dash, ( — ) the inter- 
rogation point, (?) the exclamation point, (!) the marks 
of parenthesis, ( ) and the marks of quotation, " ". 



108 Appe?idix. Rules for Punctuation. 

The following are the general rules for using these se- 
veral marks. 

Rule 1 . The full stop is to be used when the words 
preceding form complete grammatical construction, and 
do not depend, for any qualification of their sense, on 
what is to follow * ; as, " He who lifts himself up to 
the observation and notice of the world, is, of all men, 
the least likely to avoid censure. For he draws upon 
himself a thousand eyes, that will narrowly inspect him 
in every part." To this rule, let it be remembered, 
Rule 3 is exceptive. 

Rule 2. The colon, semi-colon, and comma, are to 
be used subordinately to each other in sentences re- 
solvable into large clauses, sub-clauses, and clauses still 
smaller. Thus, in the following example, a colon is 
used where the sentence divides into its two principal 

* While a nominative expects its verb, a verb its nomina- 
tive ; an adjective its noun, or a noun its adjective ; while a 
verb is to come, which will look back to a preceding clause 
for its grammatical subject; or a relative pronoun, which 
will look, in the same manner, for its antecedent ; while long 
clauses of complex sentences are dependent on what is to fol- 
low, as is the case in the very sentence now in progress : the 
construction of the sentence is manifestly incomplete. But 
the construction should also be deemed incomplete, if the 
words, though grammatically independent of those that are 
to follow, do not form the sense preconceived by the writer, 
except by being taken in connexion with them. Hence the 
members separated by the perpendicular line in the following 
sentences, are to be distinguished by a comma, and not by a 
full stop : " I would not hear his apology, | because I thought 
him a deceiver." " God made the country, | and man made 
the town." 



Appendix. Rules for Punctuation, 109 

parts ; a semi- colon, where the former principal part 
divides into two subordinate parts ; and commas, where 
those subordinate parts are still further divisible : " As 
we perceive the shadow to have moved along the dial, 
but did not perceive it moving ; and it appears that the 
grass has grown, though nobody ever saw it grow : so 
the advances we make in learning, as they consist of 
such minute steps, are only perceivable by the dis- 
tance." 

Rule 3. But the most common employment of the 
colon and semi-colon, is to point off those portions of 
discourse, which, though grammatically independent 
of what follows, are yet so closely connected in mean- 
ing, that the writer is averse to using the full stop, ac- 
cording to Rule 1. Examples : " We cannot penetrate 
futurity : all is a blank to our view ; a dark unknown 
presents itself." " Modesty is one of the chief orna- 
ments of youth ; and it has ever been esteemed a pre- 
sage of rising merit.'' This rule leaves much to dis- 
cretion, but it is as precise a one as can be formed from 
the actual practice of writers ; some of whom point 
higher than others ; that is, some use a full stop w r here 
another w r ould use a colon, and a colon where another 
would use a semi-colon. Consistency of practice must 
always be mainly regarded. 

Rule 4. One principal employment of the comma, 
is to point off clauses which are too long to stand with- 
out any stop. We may, for example, write the follow- 
ing sentence without commas : " A man of generosity 
will not give pain to a vanquished enemy by insolent 



i 



110 Appendix. Rules for Punctuation. 

deportment." But the clauses being made longer, will 
require to be pointed off thus : " A man of generous 
and heroic feelings, will not give pain to a vanquished 
enemy, by displaying a haughty and insolent deport- 
ment*." This rule, likewise, of necessity leaves much 
to discretion, and the pupil is warned, as before, to be 
consistent in his practice. 

Rule 5. Another principal employment of the 
comma, is to point off clauses which intervene or break 
the connexion between the parts of sentences, or which, 
in any way, come out of their usual place. We may, 
for example, write the following sentence without com- 
mas : " The tutor lays the foundation of the pupil's ho- 
nour by instruction, ,, But if the last clause, instead of 
being in its natural place, comes first in the sentence, 
or intervenes between any following words, a comma or 
commas must be used : thus ; "By instruction, the 
tutor lays the foundation of the pupil's honour." " The 

* The clauses of a sentence are those portions of it which 
must be taken together in an enlarged analysis, before we re- 
solve it into single words. In the sentence above, the words 
which form the subject of the verb are a clause; the verb and 
its necessary adjuncts are another clause; and the words con- 
stituting the object of the preposition by, are a third clause. 
The second clause is subdivisible at pain, but as there is no 
smaller stop than a comma, we do best to leave the place 
without any stop. A relative pronoun sometimes begins, and 
sometimes does not begin, a new clause: " The gentle mind 
is like the smooth stream, which reflects every object in its 
just proportions." " Many of the evils which occasion our 
complaints of the world, are wholly imaginary ." 



Appendix, Rales for Punctuation. Ill 

tutor, by instruction, lays the foundation of the pupil's 
honour." " The tutor lays, by instruction, the founda- 
tion of the pupil's honour *." 

Rule 6. Nouns, adjectives* verbs, or adverbs, oc- 
curring in single series, are to be separated from each 
other by commas ; as, " Reason, virtue, answer one 
great aim." " The husband, wife, and children, suf- 
fered extremely." " Plain, honest f truth, wants no 
artificial covering." " David w r as a brave, wise, and 
piaus f man." " In a letter, we may advise, exhort, 
comfort, request, and discuss." " Success generally 
depends on acting prudently, steadily, and vigorously, 
in what we undertake." 

But two nouns, adjectives, verbs, or adverbs, paired 
by a conjunction copulative or disjunctive, and not 
being part of a longer series, are to have no comma 
between them ; as 3 " Virtue and vice form a strong 

* Some further examples are here added of the use of the 
comma in pointing off intervening clauses: 

" The path of piety and virtue, pursued with a constant 
spirit, will assuredly lead to happiness." 

" What can be said to alarm those of their danger, who, 
intoxicated with pride, become giddy and insolent?" 

" If, from any internal cause, a man's peace of mind be dis- 
turbed, in vain we load him with riches or honours." 

" Continue, my dear child, to make virtue thy principal 
study." 

" Hope, the balm of life, soothes us under every misfortune." 

f There is no comma after the last adjective, because it 
immediately joins its noun. But in a series of nouns before 
a verb, the comma comes after the last noun as well as after 
the others, because a pause is always admissible between a 
noun and its verb. 



112 Appendix. Rules for Punctuation. 

contrast." " We must avoid being negligent or care- 
less." " Study expands and ennobles the mind." " We 
know not whether they acted well or ill." 

Rule 7. The words frst, secondly, formerly, lastly, 
nay, so, hence, again, once more, above all, on the con- 
trary, in the next place, in short, and all other words 
and phrases of the same kind, must generally be distin- 
guished by commas ; as, " Remember thy best and 
first friend ; formerly, the support of thy infancy, and 
the guide of thy childhood ; now, the guardian of thy 
youth, and the hope of thy coming years." " He 
feared want; hence, he overvalued riches." "This 
conduct may heal the difference; nay, it may con- 
stantly prevent any in future." " Finally, I shall only 
repeat what has been often said, If the spring put forth 
no blossoms, in summer there will be no beauty, and 
in autumn, no fruit ; so, if youth be trifled away with- 
out improvement, riper years may be contemptible, and 
old age, miserable." 

Rule 8. The dash is to be used where the sentence 
breaks off abruptly ; where the construction is of an in- 
terrupted nature; where some unexpected transition 
occurs ; and where, instead of proceeding at once to 
complete a sentence, we repeat something already said 
in the same or different words : the following are ex- 
amples : "If thou art he — but oh ! how fallen ! how 
degraded!" " If acting conformably to the will of our 
Creator ; — if promoting the welfare of mankind around 
us ; — if securing our own happiness ; — are objects of 
the highest moment : — then we are loudly called upon 
to extend the great interests of religion and virtue." 



Appendix. Rules for Punctuation. 113 

" Here lies the great — false marble ! where ? 
Nothing but sordid dust lies here." 

" We must not suppose that a just man — he who uni- 
formly acts according to the dictates of his conscience — ■ 
does not always find, within his own breast, an abun- 
dant reward." 

Rule 9. The interrogation point, the exclamation 
point, the marks of parenthesis, and the marks of quo- 
tation, are to be used as indicated by the following ex- 
amples : " Who adorned the heavens with such exqui- 
site beauty*?" "How many instances have we of 
chastity and excellence in the fair sexf!" 

" Know then this truth, (enough for man to know J,) 
Virtue alone is happiness below." 

" Shakspeare says of a talkative man, ' He speaks 
an infinite deal of nothing :* — how many such charac- 
ters we meet with!" 

* A note of interrogation should not be employed in cases 
where it is only said that a question is asked, and where the 
words are not used as a question ; as, " I asked him why be 
trembled." 

f It is a vulgar practice to put a note or notes of admira- 
tion at the end of a sentence which is not really of an excla- 
mative kind, but which merely narrates something that is 
thus indicated to be wonderful, lamentable, reprehensible, 
or dreadful. 

X The learner must distinguish between intervening mem- 
bers that need merely commas, and such clauses or sentences 
of distinct import, as require the parenthetical marks. 



114 Appendix. Rules for Punctuation. 

Beside learning to employ the points properly, the 
young writer must attend to good usage in beginning 
his words with capital or small letters. In general, he 
is to begin all words with small letters, except 

The first word of his Theme, Exercise, or other 
Composition : 

The first word of any of its divisions : 

The first word after every full stop : 

The first word after the interrogation or exclamation 
points, if the members they terminate have as complete 
a meaning as those which require a full stop : 

Proper names of all kinds ; as, George, York, the 
Thames, the Strand : 

Adjectives derived from the proper names of places ; 
as Grecian, Roman, English : 

Every principal word in the titles of books ; as Thom- 
son's Seasons, Rollin's Ancient History : 

The appellations of the Deity, and the pronouns that 
stand for Him : 

The pronoun I ; the interjection O ; and 

The first word of every line in poetry. 



THE END. 



LONDON: 

PRINTED BY R. GILBERT, 

st. John's square. 



F£B2-1949 




^o s 



S Q. 






«5 Q* 













^v *o 









^O 




■■"V /, 



^0< 



r 0- * •> * o , v. -^ 

Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proce 
* A Neutralizing aaent: Maanesium Oxide 



V* . 



'\.J" \> J 



>? "^ 








°*+ 



ueaciamea using tne booKKeeper proc 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Sept. 2004 



*~ yj treatment uate: sept. 2UU4 

* ft- °^ PreservationTechnologif 

C^ '/ ! A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATI 

< \ <^ij. 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drivp 



'"• X J> 




cS ^ 



1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724) 779-21 1 1 





0°' - % G ' , 

£ Oft : v 




